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Aesthetics of the Brink: Environmental Crisis and the Sublime in Mary Shelley‘s Frankenstein
and Philip K. Dick‘s Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?
Chairperson: Louise Economides
Mary Shelley‘s Frankenstein is today remembered as the progenitor of the science fiction
genre, the first major literary work to link a long history of fictional narratives concerning the
origins of life – notably drawing itself from the stories of Prometheus and Milton‘s Paradise
Lost – to the scientific rationalism of the enlightenment. Of the science fiction stories that would
follow, Philip K. Dick‘s Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? perhaps remains one of the
closest to Shelley‘s novel in terms of its concerns and themes. Dick‘s text is concerned with the
thematic of the creation of human simulacra, but its interests are more involved with the ethical
implications of technological advancement on society than the fantastic technologies he writes
of. Given these similarities, notions of nature and the environment might seem ancillary to an
analysis of these texts. These issues, however, are precisely what my thesis claims to be central
to a proper understanding of Dick‘s and Shelley‘s novels.
The aesthetic categories of the beautiful, and most importantly the sublime, are essential
to this research. Both classic works of aesthetic theory – namely Burke and Kant – as well as
mobilizations of the sublime that account for contemporary cultural trends – such as those of
Fredric Jameson and Jean-Francois Lyotard – are utilized so as to track an epistemological shift
in both conceptions of the sublime, as well as the relationship between humanity and its
environment. This shift, from viewing the natural world as a space wherein humans immanently
dwell, to a positivist notion of nature as resources for human manipulation – documented in
Caroline Merchant‘s The Death of Nature – can be linked to what Leo Marx describes as the
movement from a natural to a technological sublime, and is both chronicled and critiqued in
Frankenstein. Dick‘s Androids picks up where Shelley‘s novel leaves off, carrying an absolute
ideological positivism to one possible conclusion, environmental and social crisis, inaugurating,
interestingly, a return to a bizarre, and textually ironic spiritualism in the form of the religion
Mercerism.
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Introduction
The sublime is about as elusive a concept as one can evoke. Even when one considers the
multitude of affective responses individuals can have to their environment, the sublime seems to
uniquely generate an excess of conceptual content, just as the movement it instills in the subject
appears to dwarf those of other emotions. This content, the mapping of theories attempting to
account for its existence and effects, its mobilization to artistic, political, and even exploitative
ends, however, ultimately seems ancillary to the experience itself; complexities no less important
than the existence of what we term the sublime, but nonetheless what we as individuals and
societies, both intuitively and reflectively bring to an experience that exists first and foremost as
a human potential for a very particular nexus of sensations. The primary aim of my project is to
detail a modern history of the interconnected, and often overlapping, articulations of what we
term the sublime, as reflected through two science fiction novels: Mary Shelley‘s Frankenstein
and Philip K. Dick‘s Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? Both of these texts contain complex
critiques of modernity centering, as I will argue, largely on notions of technology and the
environment. The sublime is one of the primary vehicles these critiques, which are conveyed as
much through the textual atmospheres of the novels, as they are the philosophical pontifications
of their authors. Not only do these novels possess striking articulations of what one might
characterize as both a natural and a technological sublime, each seems to depict a pivot-point in
the relationship of these differing experiences to one another; an exchange between a dominant
and subordinate epistemology, beginning with Frankenstein’s depiction of a movement from a
natural to a technological sublime, and ending with Android’s1 desperate return to a naturalistic
form of spirituality in response to social and ecological crisis.
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The sublime in Frankenstein – due in part to Shelley‘s affiliation with the romantic
literary movement – has received a fair amount of critical attention. Comparatively, little has
been done with the sublime in the context of Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?, though
much has been made of Dick‘s depictions of modern cultural trends. Interestingly, despite their
similarities, and the canonical status afforded to both texts in their respective traditions,
intertextual work with these novels has largely circumvented Dick‘s Androids in favor of Ridley
Scott‘s 1982 film adaptation, Blade Runner. Jay Clayton, for instance, has written on the
connections between Shelley‘s novel and the film Blade Runner for The Cambridge Companion
to Mary Shelley. Other research has addressed the thematic relationship between Frankenstein
and Androids only tangentially. Calvin Ritch‘s essay ―The French Dick: Villiers de l'Isle-Adam,
Philip K. Dick, and the Android,‖ for example, is primarily concerned with the similarities
between Dick‘s work and that of 19th century French writer Jean de Villiers. Despite the lack of
scholarship linking Shelley‘s novel to Dick‘s, however, a nexus of common tropes and concerns
manifests itself in the critical traditions surrounding them. Ritch addresses not only the most
prominent commonality between the novels – namely the social effects of technological
advancement – but also the ambiguity each author places upon the moral status of creator and
creation; the question of whether the ―monster‖ or its progenitor is the true abomination.
Analysis of this theme has been taken up with considerable rigor by scholars of both Dick and
Shelley, as have the critiques of social progress associated with both authors.
Gender issues are also of interest to Ritch, who notes the misogynistic paranoia of both
Dick‘s and Villiers‘ depictions of artificial ―others,‖ as well as Victor Frankenstein‘s oft
criticized cooptation of the apparatus of female reproduction. Questions of gender are also
addressed in David Dresser‘s essay, ―The New Eve,‖ which analyzes Frankenstein’s and Blade
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Runner’s numerous allusions to Milton‘s Paradise Lost. His research observes a common theme
of marginalization linking the major figures of these works, Victor Frankenstein and Blade
Runner’s Rick Deckard, to their ―monstrous‖ counterparts – the Creature, replicants, and
Milton‘s Satan. According to Dresser, all of these figures are cordoned off from society, either
through a privileged social prospective (Deckard/Frankenstein) or societal alienation (the
Creature/replicants/Satan), in a manner that informs a sort of liminality. This liminality serves to
complicate the epistemological binaries inherited from what – during the time of their respective
compositions – were considered to be their more canonical/literary forbearers: biblical
scholarship for Milton, Paradise Lost for Shelley, and Frankenstein for Blade Runner. Inherent
to this process is a deconstruction not only of power hierarchies based upon notions like genius
and authenticity but, intimately connected to these, those of gender as well. Notions of hybridity
have often been used by feminist scholars – Donna Haraway‘s ―Cyborg Manifesto‖ for instance
– to describe female subject positions. These themes of hybridity and marginality not only
resonate with Frankenstein, but also find an interesting correlative in Dick‘s ambivalent
depictions of both android and female others.
Though many of the interests of these critics intersect with my project, approaching both
Frankenstein and Androids – either directly or through the lens of Blade Runner – from an
aesthetic/ecological perspective is, I believe, unique. The advantage to such an approach is that it
affords an impression of cultural motion surrounding these issues that otherwise might be lacked
when addressing these texts individually. The following two chapters mobilize numerous
theories of the sublime in order to track the history of this aesthetic experience I believe to be
contained in these novels; these works include both classical treaties – i.e. Burke and Kant – as
well as more contemporary works – in particular those of Fredric Jameson‘s and Jean-Francois
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Lyotard. The purpose of detailing how each of these interpretations of the sublime can be applied
to Frankenstein and Androids, is to depict not merely how conceptions of the sublime have
changed over time, but also to show the complex ways in which these discourses overlap with
and inform one another, as well as the larger social and environment issues facing modernity. If,
however, there is to be intellectual coherence between the theories of the scholars addressed
herein, many agreeing but others contradicting the ideas of their predecessors and peers, I feel
that this idea of sublimity must have some sort of grounding.
To this end I have chosen to map the sublime, and the aesthetic to which Edmund Burke
first notably contrasted it, the beautiful, in spatial terms. If, as Burke, Kant and others have
asserted, the beautiful is responsible for generating certain social norms – whether they be tied to
notions of a nurturing domesticity (Burke), or an appreciation for the universality of aesthetic
appreciation (Kant‘s purposive purposelessness) – then the sublime can be conceptualized as a
limit to this socialization; either in terms of a threat to this order (Burke and Lyotard‘s privation),
or a horizon of possibility (the appreciation of the rational mind Kant defines as a hallmark of the
mathematical sublime, or the American ebullience for innovation notably explored by Leo Marx,
Rob Wilson and David Nye). What I find helpful about this model is how it ties both of these
aesthetic categories directly to conceptions of place, and thus the political and environmental
concerns intimately connected with notions of dwelling. A number of oft theorized binaries
manifest themselves through this rough categorization: feminine and masculine; humbleness and
ambition; construction and deconstruction. The most important of these, however, seems the
contrast between civilization and the wild: spaces cultivated by humans and those yet to be.
The sublime can thus be concretized first and foremost as an experience defined by the
uncertainties of limits: the spatial, cultural, and technological horizons around which the
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concerns and aspirations of a society form. Whether fostering ambitions about possibilities
unrealized, or fears of the unknown, societies are often defined by their complicated and, at
times, contradictory relationships to what is perceived to be exterior to them. This relationship
between interior and exterior seems to take on an interesting and unique twist in the modern era,
localizing the unknown not in the outside world, but rather within the potentialities – positive
and negative – immanent in the society itself. American fascination with both the practical and
ethical possibilities of technological innovation, as well as the cultural malaise Fredric Jameson
argues is an effect of postmodern culture, are examples of the sublime‘s colonization of society.
The result is not merely the sense of alienation from civil and social institutions described by
Jameson, but also an alienation from the environment, as day-to-day human life seems to depend
more on these institutions than the physical world that surrounds us.
A sense of immanence within one‘s environment is thus something – arguably – lacking
in the modern/postmodern era, as these economic and bureaucratic abstractions increasingly
become the substrate of everyday life. Mary Shelley‘s Frankenstein, despite its numerous
descriptions of idyllic planes and striking mountain vistas, in many ways marks the inauguration
of these concerns into the novelistic medium. Her text, much like those of her romantic peers, is
concerned first and foremost with notions of genius. She differs from these writers, however, in
that her novel is as much a critique of the possibilities of unrestrained intellect as it is a
celebration. Victor‘s aspirations, rather than reflecting the libratory potential of the imagination,
lead inexorably to social myopia and woe, harming the very world from which the romantic
genius supposedly drew his inspiration. As Anne K. Mellor notes, figures like Victor and Robert
Walton – the explorer who rescues Frankenstein in the Arctic – represent a sort of vanguard of
progress within the novel; pushing the bounds of European society into the wilderness of both
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uncharted territories and the human intellect. Though the materiality of the novel‘s natural
landscapes presents a compelling imagistic contrast between pastoral centers and sublime
peripheries, the novel seems to localize the true nexus of these forces within the imagination
itself, Victor‘s mind seemingly colonized by the demons of his own inspiration.
Though addressing questions of humanism in a world of rapid technological advance, a
theme that would become the hallmark of the science fiction genre, Mary Shelley‘s Frankenstein
is still very much a product of romanticism; high cultural aspirations concerned with the
imaginations of great individuals moving society forward, while leaving the everyday of lives of
average citizens – for the moment – relatively unchanged and in supposed comfort. Though the
novel notably marks the movement of the sublime Leo Marx describes in The Machine in the
Garden, from its localization in objects exterior to the subject, to immanence within the intellect
itself, the sublime in Frankenstein is still kept at an aesthetic distance, juxtaposed to poetic
descriptions of the domesticity the novel prizes so highly2.
Do Androids Dream fails to afford its characters or readers this sort of tranquil space.
According to Fredic Jameson the essential difference between high modernist literature –
arguably the heir to romanticism – and Dick‘s chosen genre, is that ―the latter can show us
everything about the individual psyche and its subjective experience and alienation, save the
essential – the logic of stereotypes, reproductions and depersonalizations in which the individual
is held in our own time, ‗like a bird caught in cobwebs‘‖ (―Dick, In Memorium‖, 348). Put
simply, the one addresses the neuroses of the individual, the other the neuroses of the society.
What is different about the sublime of Androids, fitting with Jameson‘s own theories of
postmodernism, is that it seems to permeate everyday domestic spaces. Responsible for this
colonization, according to Jameson, is capitalism and its linking of day to day human life to the
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increasing complexity of artificial institutions. The resulting mystification of these institutions, a
product of the average citizen‘s inability to comprehend their intricacies, is what he terms the
postmodern sublime: a cultural obsession with conspiracies that seemingly hold within their grip
the entirety of human civilization. Jameson‘s interest in Do Androids Dream – and Dick‘s work
in general – stems from his conviction that these works constitute both an affectation and a
diagnosis of these difficult to understand/articulate cultural issues stemming from modernity. As
Dick moves the locus of the science fiction genre from the subject of the inventor and his
astounding creation, or the epic hero and his fight to save civilization, to the domain of the
everyman – Deckard, the morally ambiguous bounty hunter and Isidore the hallowed repair truck
driver – the unease evoked by the unwanted and unforeseen by-products of technological and
cultural advancement subsume the novel. No harmonious status-quo exists to be disrupted, and
no moments of beatific reprieve ease the harshness of the narrative. Androids opens with
domestic conflict, the plot then spiraling out into pontifications on cultural and environmental
ruin.
The invasion of this unease into the cultural space of the novel imposes the sublime upon
everyday life. The wilds of Do Androids Dream, the limits against which individuals and the
societies test themselves – supposedly pushed back by the incredible technological and social
complexity of civilization – come again to be the manifest reality of human life, with one
difference. Survival in marginal environments, where the moment-to-moment existence of the
subject is constantly called into question, ostensibly closes out the possibility of sublime
experience. In order for this aesthetic category to manifest itself the fear inducing object, the
boundary between ease and comfort, and whatever expands before humanity as a space for new
horizons or the foreclosing of these possibilities – to which the sublimes is a reflection – must
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have the intellectual breathing room Burke and Kant were among the first to describe as a proper
aesthetic distance from the dangers of the natural world. On the post-apocalyptic, postmodern
Earth of Androids, however, the technologically mediated lives of Dick‘s characters – whose
very emotions are often controlled through consumer appliances – provide them with a facile
reprieve from their marginal environment, even as its decay increasingly threatens to shatter this
illusion. Thus the human subject is returned to a recognition of his or her own immanence within
the environment from which s/he felt humanity had, through cultural advancement, escaped. The
space of the beautiful, and more importantly the protection it implies, is no longer required for
sublime experiences to constitute themselves. Instead, electronic devices provide an impression
of cultural order, while on the couches of dilapidated city apartments John Isidore and Iran
Deckard silently reflect upon the disintegration of material being beating against the walls of
their own existence, while proving incapable of removing themselves from either this reality or
their recognition of its imminent end.
The novel‘s recourse is perhaps the only logical one left in such a world; the development
of sublimity into a reflection of human thought, narrated in the story of Frankenstein, returns to
the seat of the spiritual in the form of Mercerism. This cultish religion seeks to instill in the
natural world exactly what it was Victor Frankenstein and the manufactures of Dick‘s androids
denied it; a sense of agency and purpose inherent to the object in-and-of itself. The following
two chapters will track the evolutions, convergences and divergences, of both mobilizations of
sublime discourse, and their relationships to larger cultural narratives surrounding questions of
humanism and the environment. The objective of this research is to note both developments in
the science fiction genre as it has grown out of Shelley‘s romanticist project, and the generality
of cultural currents immanent within these trends, laying out what might not be strictly
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considered a dialogical account of history, but an impression of the movement and
interconnection existing between these two novels and their shifting representations of the
sublime; these representations in turn inform one‘s understanding of the complex cultural milieu
in which each texts was written as refracted through the novelistic medium – itself an expressive
map of the human intellect.
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Chapter 1
Mary Shelley‘s Frankenstein is replete with a vast array of complex and often disparate
depictions of nature. The concept of nature, the natural world and what it means to us – humanity
as a species, and humans as individuals – is about as nebulous a term as one can evoke. Yet
despite the word‘s epistemological density, Frankenstein seems to encapsulate a great number of
the connotations spiraling about this contentious signifier. The themes of Pastoralism, nature as
mother, nature as destroyer, and finally nature as helpless victim all find voice within Shelley‘s
novel. Despite its prevalence, however, or perhaps because of it, the idea of nature has not
traditionally been what readers thematically take from the text – both in terms of analytical
interpretations and the numerous adaptations made of the work – but rather nature‘s negative: the
artificial, the human endeavors of science and technological advancement.
Marilyn Butler argues in her essay, ―Frankenstein and Radical Science,‖ that the most
common interpretation of the Frankenstein myth – for the story has unquestionably taken on
mythic proportions in modern society – posit Shelley‘s narrative as a cautionary tale about the
dangers of scientific hubris: the co-optation of nature or God‘s power of creation. It is exactly
this reading of ―don‘t get too clever with technology‖ that Butler seeks to disavow (302). She
does so by positioning the narrative within the debate between William Lawrence – Percy
Shelley‘s physician and a close friend of the family – and his chief intellectual rival in the vitalist
debates of 1814-19, John Abernethy. The topic of these debates was the relationship between
Christianity and modern secular science; a contentious issue Butler feels directly impacted the
writing of Frankenstein:
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Frankenstein the blundering experimenter, still working with superseded notions,
suggests the position of Abernethy, who proposes that the superadded lifeelement is analogous to electricity – particularly when he uses a machine,
reminiscent of a battery, to impart the spark of life. Frankenstein‘s other
procedures are made unpleasantly anti-life, recalling Lawrence‘s unfavorable
comparison of inorganic with organic methods. (307)
In Butler‘s eyes, rather than having too much scientific knowledge, Shelley‘s protagonist in fact
has too little. Frankenstein‘s obsession with occult figures, such as ―Cornelius Agrippa, Albertus
Magnus, and Paracelsus,‖ ground his early thought in specious and outdated notions, spoiling his
later up-to-date schooling in the contemporary natural sciences (Shelley 23). Butler argues the
incredible eloquence of the Creature – especially when compared to his creator – and the reversal
of roles between ―father‖ and ―offspring‖ late in the novel as ―the Creature slowly emerge[s] as
the dominant partner‖ during the pursuit through the Arctic, imply a more complex figure than
the monster‘s reduction to mere scientific abomination could allow (311).
Radically contrasting Butler is Warren Montag‘s Marxist reading, which attributes to
Frankenstein’s ‗mystification‘ of the scientific process a need to obfuscate the very social
anxieties silently driving the action of the novel: ―[the] internal contradictions and antagonism…
that every work, no matter how apparently coherent, embodies and perhaps transforms but
cannot resolve‖ (390). For Montag the Creature, and lack of scientific detail mobilized to
describe his creation, paradoxically symbolizes the textual ―unrepresentability‖ of the proletariat
and the industrial processes that inaugurated its inception into 19th century European society. The
text turns away from this ―workshop,‖ reflecting instead upon idealized depictions of aristocratic
pastoralism and natural fecundity. The ever present specter of the ―Monster‖ thus represents the
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inability of the text to fully retreat into a prelapsarian past – before the industrial process began –
to solve the problems of the present, the antagonisms of which, at the time of Shelley‘s writing,
were seemingly insurmountable.
Both scholars compellingly stake out contradictory critical ground. Butler‘s analysis of
Frankenstein successfully contrasts two disparate views of science – the mysticism of the
vitalists (Abernethy) versus the more empirically sound research of the materialists (Lawrence) –
in order to deconstruct the notion of Frankenstein as a sharp criticism of technological
advancement. Her essay largely fails, however, to fill the space it creates with a meaning outside
of this distinction. Montag mobilizes this ambiguity in the novel‘s representations of science to
construct an acutely political reading of the text; modern science and technology are precisely
what Frankenstein is concerned with because of its inability to properly represent them. This
chapter will elaborate what I see as a complex critical space existing between these positions.
Though it is true that Shelley‘s novel extends beyond a simple critique of modern science, it is
also reductive to regard Frankenstein‘s folly as a mere fetishistic fascination with the occult.
Alternatively, the concerns immanent within Frankenstein about the progress represented by
Enlightenment thinking possibly running amok is more nuanced than Montag‘s suggestion of
textual repression.
Here another distinction between the modes of scientific inquiry, posed by Anne Mellor,
proves instructive. She argues the novel contains a ―feminist critique of science,‖ distinguishing
between ―good science,‖ striving to understand the intricacies of the natural world, and ―‘bad‘
science, the hubristic manipulations of the elemental forces of nature‖ (Mellor, Mary Shelley:
Her Life, Her Fictions, Her Monsters 89). From Mellor‘s prospective there is something
fundamentally conservative in Shelley‘s writing: skepticism of the progressive powers of not
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only scientific experimentation but, perhaps more profound, the romantic imagination itself.
Indeed, this seminal science fiction novel seems to have more in common with dystopian
skepticism than utopian ideals, arguably making Mary Shelley‘s novel a rhetorical counterpoint
to her husband‘s socialist politics. Timothy Morton makes a similar assertion in Shelley and the
Revolution in Taste, arguing the novel strives towards the exact realization of the Romantic ideal
espoused by her husband, only to plunge this ideal into ruin:
[Marry Shelley] sets up a reformist plan, deconstructs it, and finds the set of
determinants which will render it hopeless… the novel is not about the sin of
presumption, the Promethean theft of fire… but about the internal failure of a
Promethean project‖ (51).
The ―reformist‖ plan of which Morton writes is Percy‘s Utopianism, a political sanguinity
Morton elsewhere contends implies an almost dialectical union between romanticist notions of
naturalism and faith in the progressive potential of the human intellect, even the ostensibly ironic
libratory potential of technology itself3. What both of these writers posit, however, is less an
absolute rejection of progressivism than a tentative argument for its limitations: seeking
scientific knowledge is good, scientific hubris is bad; Utopian impulses might have the potential
to envision more egalitarian futures, but circumstances can often derail their potential for
realization. Thus the binary between interpreting the Creature as either symbolic of the specious,
outmoded scientific concepts of the vitalists, or the specter of technologic industrialism seems
reductive. In order to escape the critical gravity of these types of readings, this chapter will
attempt to recontextualize the Creature as indicative not of scientific experimentation itself, but
rather – as previously stressed – humanity‘s relationship to nature, of which science proves but
one of numerous lenses.
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Rather than representing technological advancement I contend the Frankenstein Creature
is symbolic of a sublime, chaotic, and most importantly displaced nature. Exhumed – quite
literally mined from the earth – Frankenstein‘s Creature, or at least its constituent parts, are
subject to an extreme objectification indicative of the radical subject object divide engendered by
Cartesian dualism, and critiqued by modern philosophers across the ideological spectrum. The
type of complexity Butler, Mellor, and Montag – among others – have elucidated in the novel‘s
depiction of science can be read in terms of the nebulous yet progressive shift from what
Caroline Merchant describes in her book, The Death of Nature, as an ―organistic‖ society to a
mechanistic one; a move from seeing nature as something human beings are connected with, to
viewing it in terms of what Martin Heidegger termed ―standing reserve‖: resources distinct from
the human subject, and purposeless until acted up by that subject. This shift, inexorably tied to
the progression of capitalism, is as much about the epistemological changes in western culture as
it is technological advancement, though the development of advanced technologies certainly
helps facilitate and define this process. Mellor‘s assertion that Frankenstein replaces ―his
scientific research for normal emotional interaction‖ is indicative of the type of cultural changes
Merchant describes, as well as reminiscent of Jurgen Habermas‘ articulation of reification,4
which he argues is inaugurated by the invasion of systemic values into the lifeworld of human
interaction (Mellor, Mary Shelley: Her Life, Her Fictions, Her Monsters). In each case the
concern articulated by these scholars – though somewhat different in tenor, critical focus and
conclusions – is the development of an absolute epistemology of what Habermas terms ―norm
free‖ rationality; a positivist ethos which prizes efficacy (economic, industrial, social) above, and
– if unmediated – to the detriment of, all else. Frankenstein does exactly this when he makes
scientific pursuits the prime driving force of his life. Though couched in what might have been a
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mild conservative reaction to her husband‘s radical politics and libertine lifestyle, Shelley‘s
Frankenstein speaks to the concerns of systemic visions of society and nature that would occupy
thinkers for generations to come, and into the present.
The text‘s mobilization of the sublime, as well as conceptions of the beautiful and
pastoralism to which it is contrasted, are key to this critique. Frankenstein‘s utopian aspirations
and follies are attributable to the breathless enthusiasm Leo Marx describes as indicative of a
freshly emerging 19th century technological sublime. This ebullience for the seemingly endless
possibilities of human rationality, is complemented by the almost solipsistic turn Kant describes
in his Critique of Judgment; the rational mind astonished by its own powers of conception folds
in upon itself creating a sort of epistemological totality. Running counter to this totality is the
commonality of conception attributed to the beautiful by Kant, with its potential to serve as the
foundation of a communal ethic. Frankenstein‘s lack of foresight about the possible ramifications
of creating his Adam is the result of this myopia. Mellor makes a similar observation when she
argues a sublime conception of nature and a beautiful one, one that evokes hostility for the
natural world versus one that evokes compassion, is the pervading theme of Shelley‘s novel5.
This analysis may itself, however, go too far. Though occasionally hostile, the sublimity of the
Alps is also described as having rejuvenating and potentially normative qualities. Sublime awe is
thus not irredeemable in Frankenstein, particularly if tempered by what Shelley seems to
exemplify as the supreme normative ground of familial affections. What is problematic is when
this experience becomes a reaction to human thought itself, the mind no longer reflecting upon
the outside world for inspiration but instead turning inward, exaggerating the alienating effects of
the sublime.
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Returning to the question of the Creature, it is exactly this ambiguity, contained in the
novel‘s evocation of the sublime, that is important to an analysis of the text. The technological
sublime is more about the ability of the rational mind to manipulate, to bend to its will, the
natural world, than it is a celebration of that mind in and of itself. The textual similarities
connecting Shelley‘s descriptions of the Creature to those of the sublime Mount Blanc are
fundamental to this interpretation. This connection between Creature and landscape links the
former with a chaotic, uncontrollable nature, harnessed by Frankenstein and thus re-coded in
terms of a technological sublime, but never truly losing its association with a natural complexity
that defies Frankenstein‘s ability to anticipate fully the ramifications of his experimentation.
Marx comments that the development of the technological sublime during the 19th century was
part of a progression: ―the awe and reverence once reserved for the Diety and later bestowed
upon the visible landscape is directed toward technology, or, rather, the technological conquest
of matter‖ (197). Merchant‘s dialectic between an ―organistic‖ and a mechanistic vision of nature
provides a natural bridge between the themes of familial affection pervading Shelley‘s novel, and
its depictions of the rejuvenating qualities of the sublime. Tempered by a proper social
grounding – the family, a reciprocal and respectful regard for the natural world – the exuberance,
ambition, and even fear represented by the sublime need not always be destructive. Instead, as
instanced by the romantic imagination of Shelley‘s husband, and notably herself, it can be
generative. Though Frankenstein ultimately ends in tragedy, this turn is, as Morton points out, as
much about genre as it is a critique of progressivism; depicting how Utopic visions can go wrong
rather than arguing they absolutely will.
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I.
The organistic cultural paradigms Merchant describes do not merely stand as simple
oppositions to the positivism/capitalism driving modern societies. She notably problematizes the
concept of a clean break between these two modes of thought, arguing instead for an uneasy
coexistence between dominant and subordinate ideologies. Though organized by seemingly
antithetical conceptions of human relations to nature, Merchant claims organisitc and
mechanistic societies never truly exist without the shadow of their ideological other. Even when
grounded by similar relationships to nature, the ―organistic‖ ideologies she analyzes often
espouse radically different socio-economic orders. Merchant writes that in particular, ―three
variations of the organic theory of society are important to the transition from organism to
mechanism‖ (Merchant 69). She describes these modes:
The body politic was metaphorically modeled on the organic unity of the human
body, and, as a hierarchy of status groups…The second variation tended toward a
leveling of the hierarchies and was based on the actual experiences of the village
community. The third, a revolutionary form of organic theory, advocated the
complete overthrow of social hierarchies. (Merchant 70)
Though each of these models advances a very different social order, ranging from feudalism to
utopian socialism – Percy Shelley‘s political ideal which Frankenstein critiques – they share an
important commonality; each was based upon a framework derived from the macrocosm of the
natural world. The body politic was founded upon the organization of the human body – the
division of labor and symbiosis of differentiated organs – the village community on the
ecological sustainability of communal living, and the millenarian utopia on the idea that ―God
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was imminent within nature, that all matter was alive,‖ fostering a holistic view of creation
founded upon divine law (Merchant 80). Despite their differences, however, each of these social
models viewed the human ―microcosm‖ in terms of the natural ―macrocosm,‖ naturalizing an
ecologically friendly attitude to the non-human world as disunity between humanity and nature
would imply the disunity of civilization itself (Merchant 100-1).
Important to each of these philosophies was their assumption of a vivifying force
animating nature, affording it autonomous agency and movement. Whether the immanent
presence of God in every object, or the natural order of ―the great chain of being,‖ a normative
grounding calling for ethical conduct not only between humans, but between humanity and the
objective world was, according to Merchant, an important part of medieval and early
Renaissance Christian ideologies. As European society began to shift to a more mechanistic
brand of thinking, however, the idea that ―force was external to matter rather than immanent
within it‖ gained sway (Merchant 102). This concept de-emphasized the interconnectedness and
agency of the natural world, allowing humanity to more radically disassociate itself from its
environment. Combined with a freshly invigorated urge to produce surplus goods (i.e. capital)
this ―mechanical framework itself could legitimate the manipulation of nature‖ (Merchant 193).
This was not a simple process, however, but a multifaceted cultural shift taking place over
generations; the product of a number of social forces, including the rise of the capitalist market
and religious warfare; additionally, the ―tensions between these two perspectives of nature
continue to be influential ever since the Scientific Revolution‖ (Merchant 103). Thus, unlike
Foucault‘s concept of an episteme – the totalizing ideological discourse that defines the thought
of an era – the move from organistic to mechanistic thinking is more a tension between center
and periphery than an utter replacement of one ideological mode by another.
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Though not absolutely totalizing, the idea of the ideological crisis point implied by the
episteme does not seem entirely out of place within the history Merchant describes: a period of
intense ideological tension which Shelley‘s artistic vision strikingly portrays. As Butler
implicitly argues, expressions of both organic and mechanistic thought can be found throughout
Frankenstein, though not necessarily along the lines she describes. For instance, Merchant
contends Cornelius Agrippa, one of the occult figures Butler associates with ‗pre-scientific‘
thought, actually presupposes the mechanistic views of modern science. Though Agrippa‘s
holistic ideologies unquestionably share certain commonalities with vitalists like Abernethy –
particularly their attempts to reconcile a more traditional Christian world view with secular
science – Merchant notes the natural magic of Agrippa can easily be linked to Lawrence‘s strict
positivism. She argues Agrippa‘s mysticism was:
based on assumptions such as the manipulation of nature and the passivity of
matter; these assumptions were ultimately assimilated into a mechanical
framework founded on technological power over nature for the collective benefit
of society (109).
Although based upon a defunct world view more commonly associated with pre-scientific
thought, Agrippa‘s efforts to manipulate nature can be linked to the ideological foundations of
modern society: a conviction about and fascination with humanity‘s ability to control the natural
world. These ideas find their manifestation not only in the hegemony of positivist rationalism,
but also in Mary Shelley‘s text as – what Montag notes is the strangely ‗unscientific‘ –
exuberance driving the creation of Frankenstein‘s ―Adam,‖ which in turn is linked by Morton
and Mellor to her husband‘s own political idealism; the notion that 19th century social and
technological advances would necessarily bring about a better future for humanity.

Schneeberger 20

Another compelling connection between Frankenstein‘s work and Enlightenment faith in
modern science is the link between descriptions of his research, the rhetoric of Francis Bacon –
often regarded as the father of scientific rationalism – and Merchant‘s analysis of the mining
practices of the mechanistic age. Frankenstein states that he ―pursued nature to her hiding
places‖ in his fevered endeavor to create new life (Shelley 32). This rhetoric bears striking
resemblance to Bacon‘s own sentiments about the need for the ―disclosure of nature‘s secrets‖ in
the pursuit of human advancement (Merchant 188). Despite one quote belonging to the
supernatural endeavors of a fictitious character and the other to the venerated progenitor of
modern science, the sentiments of both statements are the same. Nature is a helpless object
whose secrets must be unearthed through the efforts of a probing humanity in the name of
progress. Like Bacon, who espoused both the idea and necessity of exercising control over the
objective world, Frankenstein seeks to dispossess nature of her secrets by excavating both the
earth – the digging up of graves – and the inner depths of the corpses he dissects. These act, and
the attitudes that inform them, mark Frankenstein as a step closer to the mechanistic rationalism
of Bacon than the natural magic of Agrippa. Though similar to Bacon‘s scientific rationalism in
its basis on an ideological framework of manipulating the external world, Merchant argues that
there are a number of crucial differences between Bacon‘s vision of nature and Agrippa‘s. Most
important of these was that the power of medieval sorcerers was restricted to individuals,
emphasizing limited personal control over the environment rather than a cultural notion of
progress predicated upon the ever increasing domination of nature: the Enlightenment ideal of
rational thinking bringing about a new age of human prosperity (Merchant 109). Additionally,
figures like Agrippa ultimately considered themselves bound to the higher authority of God,
manipulating an animate – rather than inanimate – world linked by the great chain of being.
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Contrasting Agrippa‘s recognition of this authority, Frankenstein envisions breaking the bonds of
life and death so as to ―pour a torrent of light into our dark world,‖ harnessing the power of
creation for the collective benefit and advancement of human kind (Shelley 32).
In pursuit of this goal Frankenstein procures the objects of his experiments in a manner
comparable to the practice of mining. The passage detailing his efforts reads:
Who shall conceive the horrors of my secret toil, as I dabbled among the
unhallowed damps of the grave, or tortured the living animal to animate the
lifeless clay?…I collected bones from charnel houses; and disturbed, with profane
fingers, the tremendous secrets of the human frame. In a solitary chamber, or
rather cell, at the top of the house… I kept my workshop of filthy creation; my
eyeballs were starting from their sockets in attending to the employment. The
dissecting room and the slaughter-house furnished many of my materials; and
often did my human nature turn with loathing from my occupation. (Shelley 33)
It is in this self-disclosing manner that Victor Frankenstein seeks out nature‘s secrets, an
endeavor he himself portrays as unethical. This manner of investigation, and the retrospective
moral indignation of its author, resembles the view of mining Merchant describes as common in
both ancient Roman and during the Renaissance. The despoiled inert corpses Frankenstein
interrogates for their secret inner workings are similar to the organistic ―image of Mother Earth,
and her generative role in the production of metals,‖ which man then toils to unearth in a form of
rape; a vision of the inner workings of nature that ―continued to be significant well into the
eighteenth century‖ (Merchant 30). The wording used by Frankenstein, ―disturbed, with profane
finger,‖ to describe his interrogations of inanimate human bodies mirrors the sentiments of
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Roman compiler Pliny about mining the Earth, which he describes: ―We penetrate into her
entrails, and seek for treasures.‖ In both the case of mining during the age of mechanism and
Frankenstein‘s research, this idea of despoiling or raping a vital world is replaced with notions of
reclaiming inert matter to be put to more practical human use; though for Frankenstein the
ethical implications of his actions become troublingly apparent upon reflection. The passage
from Shelley‘s novel describes him animating the ―lifeless clay‖ of human flesh, temporarily
forcing Frankenstein to subdue his ―human nature.‖ The ethical imperatives implied in the
passage – and which disparage his actions – are akin to the normative modes of thinking that
made mining unethical.
Merchant asserts this concept of a living, organically productive Mother Earth naturalized
an ethical interdiction against the invasive processes of mining, an ideological imperative that
would have to be overcome for capitalism to flourish. The new market economy, rather than
being based upon the resources of wood, water and wind – which drove medieval societies – was
fueled instead by coal and ―an inorganic economic core – metals: iron, copper, silver, gold, tin,
and mercury,‖ necessitating wide-scale excavations to acquire in sufficient quantities (Merchant
63). In Shelley‘s novel, Frankenstein himself disparages the practice of mining, describing his
work: ―I appeared rather like one doomed by slavery to toil in the mines, or any other
unwholesome trade, than an artist occupied by his favorite employment‖ (Shelley 33). Victor not
only chastises his own endeavors in this passage, but also provides a metaphoric link between his
actions and the ―unwholesome trade‖ of mining. The use of living animals is also described as
part of his experiments, expanding the mechanistic view of nature as an object domain for human
manipulation beyond the inanimate, as a strong dividing line is drawn between ‗thinking‘
subjects and other living creatures, which are often reduced to a utilitarian use value. This is
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comparable to the ethos which drove unrestrained mining practices, the residual effects of which,
water contamination and swaths of despoiled land, emanate outward in unpredictable and
harmful ways, symbolized in the sublime complexity of Mount Blanc. Just as Frankenstein‘s
―mining‖ creates a rift between humanity and nature, this rift reflects back upon Victor‘s
fractured social life – much like Merchant‘s microcosm/macrocosm model – implying a strong
interconnection between the two.
II.
Though Victor Frankenstein‘s work adheres to a mechanistic view of nature, the presence
of organistic ideas and practices can also be found in Shelley‘s novel. In her essay, ―Possessing
Nature: The Female in Frankenstein,‖ Anne K. Mellor draws a strong dividing line between the
Frankenstein family and the De Laceys, from whom the Creature learns his speech. Mellor‘s
essay focuses largely on Romantic-era conceptions of domesticity: the separation of the duties
ascribed to men and women into distinct spheres of influence, the public and the domestic
respectively. Both Victor and Captain Robert Walton – whose narratives of his encounter with
Frankenstein bookend the novel – are placed firmly in the public sphere. In contrast, Victor‘s
cousin and intended Elizabeth, as well as Walton‘s sister Margret, are kept in the relative
solitude and safety of domestic life – a role Elizabeth at least professes to Frankenstein that she
regrets; lamenting ―that she [does] not have the same opportunities of enlarging her experience
and cultivating understanding‖ when Victor leaves for England (Shelley 106). Mellor posits a
particularly radical divide in Frankenstein between the public and the domestic, pointing out the
extent to which Victor distances himself from his family during the course of his research, and
the extreme incarnations of ―a patriarchal ideal of female self sacrifice‖ realized in the figures of
Elizabeth and Frankenstein‘s mother (276, ―Possessing Nature‖). The result of this divide,
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Mellor claims, ―is the separation of masculine work from domestic affections [which] leads
directly to Frankenstein‘s downfall‖ (275). In her reading it is Victor‘s radical separation from
his family that allows him to so grievously defy the laws of nature and produce his creature.
Mellor‘s analysis references the early capitalist trend described by Merchant wherein ―as
the trades and crafts began to adopt the capitalistic mode of employing wage workers, the wives
of master craftsmen had less opportunity for participation‖ (Merchant 152). As mechanism took
hold women, who were often more closely associated with nature, were increasingly
marginalized by a society which felt that in order to progress it needed to distance itself from and
control the material world. Mellor claims the novel upholds the De Lacey family as an ideal
counterpoint to this rigid conception of domesticity. In the De Lacey family, she writes, ―all
work is shared equally in an atmosphere of rational companionship, mutual concern, and love‖
(277). The communalism Mellor emphasizes in the De Lacey family not only provides an
alternative social structure to that found in the Frankenstein family, but also shares a number of
similarities with the organistic village communities described by Merchant, harmoniously
sharing labor throughout a community of relative equals.
Though the De Lacey family certainly reflects an organistic or pastoral6 ideal within
Shelley‘s novel, Mellor seems to dismiss the possibility of the Frankenstein family – its
unfortunate patriarchal structure aside – also serving as a counterpoint to Victor‘s
experimentation. Frankenstein comments of his childhood, ―no youth could have passed more
happily than mine,‖ his early family life described as harmoniously as that of the De Lacey‘s
(Shelley 20). Indeed, it is the disruption of this idyllic home that makes Victor Frankenstein‘s
story so tragic as the kind, gentle lives of his family members and friends are cut short by the
creation of his monster and his inability or unwillingness to sate the creature‘s own desires for

Schneeberger 25

companionship. Thus, like the De Lacey family, the Frankensteins can be seen as providing an
alternative to the mechanistic world view that drives Victor‘s research and leads to his – and
their – eventual ruin.
Though Mellor is right to point out the self-sacrificing aspects of Elizabeth‘s character,
whose wants and drives are often subsumed by those of others in the novel – particularly
Victor‘s – she is not entirely without an air of individualism. Frankenstein contrasts his
childhood temperament with Elizabeth‘s: ―I delighted in investigating the fact relative to the
actual world; she busied herself in following the aerial creations of the poets. The world was to
me a secret, which I desired to discover; to her it was a vacancy; which she sought to people with
imaginations of her own‖ (Shelley 20). Though lacking her cousin‘s interest in the
natural/scientific world, Elizabeth‘s imagination is her own. Despite being deprived of many of
the opportunities enjoyed by Victor, a university education and world travel, this passage as well
as Elizabeth‘s ardent defense of the unjustly executed Justine, in the face of the maid‘s near
universal condemnation, complicate – to an extent – Mellor‘s interpretation of her as the iconic
docile woman7.
In fact, Elizabeth is comparable to another arguably submissive literary figure, Cordelia,
King Lear‘s youngest daughter from the Shakespearian play. Merchant describes Shakespeare‘s
Cordelia as representative of a ―utopian nature, or nature as the ideal unity of opposites‖
(Merchant 7). This dialectical ideal, though capable of espousing the type of progressivism
indicative of mechanistic world views, appeals to the notion of a holistic balance within nature
more representative of organistic thought. Similarly, Elizabeth can be seen as providing a holistic
union of antitheses, contrasting the sharp subject/object divide guiding Victor‘s experiments. Her
polyvalent status as cousin, surrogate daughter, and intended wife of the family‘s eldest son
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position her within a system of opposites: she is at once exterior and interior to the nuclear
family, sister and potential lover to Frankenstein. Additionally, she stands as a bedrock for the
family during difficult times, expressing simultaneously an air of both weakness and strength.
Thus, akin to Cordelia, she can be seen as representing a more holistic vision of nature in
contrast to Victor‘s mechanistic one –though this role itself is problemitized somewhat by the
extent of Elizabeth‘s willingness for self sacrifice.
Mellor‘s own aesthetic observations about the sublime and the beautiful in Frankenstein
outline Elizabeth‘s importance to the text. She writes of this distinction: ―the sublime appeals to
the instinct of self-preservation and rouses feelings of terror that result in a lust for power,
domination, and continuing control. But the beautiful appeals to the instinct of self-procreation
and rouses sensations of both erotic and affectional love‖ (137). According to Mellor these
differing aesthetic experiences have a profound impact upon how characters in the novel
confront nature, and thus their disposition towards it; the sublime leading to a need to dominate
and the beautiful one to coexist and nurture – though for the sake of her argument she perhaps
delineates too strongly between the two. In Mellor‘s model it is obviously Frankenstein who
approaches the world through the category of the sublime. It is not so much the DeLacy family,
however, as Elizabeth, and Victor‘s childhood friend Clerval8, that she directly associates with
the beautiful, the power of this aesthetic mode ascribing considerable significance to these
characters through its capacity to offer a counter ideology to Frankenstein‘s positivism.
Indeed, Kant‘s own work with the beautiful proves illuminating in this context. Kant‘s
primary distinction between the beautiful and what he terms the ―agreeable,‖ is that the charm of
the latter need only apply to individual subjects. The beautiful, in contrast, elicits what Kant
describes as ―purposive purposelessness,‖ meaning that though the rational mind can define no
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logical telos for beautiful objects based upon transcendental concepts, an impression of causal
logic inheres in the object through the interplay of sensations and rational understanding
facilitated by the imagination. This means that for Kant, beauty adheres to a universal standard,
which is instructive in the context of Frankenstein as the refinement of a conception of beauty
symbolizes the height of socialization in the Critique of Judgment: unlike rational thought or
experiences of the agreeable, the beautiful requires the subject to override ―the private subjective
conditions of his judgment… and [reflect] on his own judgment from a universal standpoint‖
(Kant 161). The cultivation of an appreciation for beauty thus requires the subject to take the
prospective of others into account, attempting to see the world through their eyes.
Not only are both Elizabeth and Clarval predisposed to experiences of the beautiful, both
are artists, concerned with the production of beautiful objects. For Kant an impression of beauty
is always elicited by the ―form‖ of an object, in the case of the art object its composition or
construction. When Frankenstein describes himself in his work as more like a miner than an
artist, the analogy works on two levels, drawing attention to the similarities between the
‗sculpting‘ of the Creature and artistic production, while simultaneously closing out the
possibility of a harmonious conceptual union between the two. This mentality is mirrored in
Frankenstein‘s childhood drive to unearth the ―facts relative to the actual world.‖ Victor‘s
ideological inclination towards utilitarian materiality guides his experimentation, an intellectual
method that notably adheres to a rationalist process that, though honed through the socialization
of education, is nonetheless allowed to function independently of the social world. No place is
this better represented than in Victor‘s own description of his completed creature: ―I had selected
his features as beautiful. Beautiful! – Great God!... now that I had finished, the beauty of the
dream vanished, and breathless horror and disgust filled my heart‖ (Shelley 34). Frankenstein‘s
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utter failure to create a being appealing to the commonality of human conception – in following
with Kant‘s model – displays his inability to account for the prospective of others. Though he
describes the process of picking features as based upon the principle beauty, Victor in fact
chooses what he finds to be ―appealing,‖ failing to account for the totality of his composition and
thus the aesthetic harmony of the Creature: how it will be perceived by the generality of human
subjects. This failure serves as an analogy for Victor‘s greater failure, to account for the possible
social, and just as important ecological implications of his research. In contrast, Elizabeth‘s –
and Clarval‘s – endeavors to construct objects ―to fill the vacancy of her own imagination‖
inherently carry with them – according to Kant – careful attenuation to the perceptions of others.9
Elizabeth, however, is arguably not without her own ties to the sublime. Indeed, Rob
Wilson‘s theorization of a space of textual vacancy which drove a sublime aesthetic defining the
American poetic tradition – though describing United States artists – resonates with Elizabeth‘s
own need to ―fill the vacancy‖ of her imagination. If Victor is largely motivated by sublime
experiences it is worth noting that Elizabeth seems almost as driven, if in a different capacity, as
her cousin. Her desire to become a traveling subject in particular evokes the Enlightenment ideal
of developing knowledge as an end in and of itself. Elizabeth is thus no more an articulation of
an absolute pastoral ideal – the receptivity to nature defined by beauty which Mellor claims is a
major theme of the novel – than Victor. Here the idea of dialectic again proves fruitful; Elizabeth
no doubt represents the ―domestic affection‖ the novel prizes so highly, her own unrealized
ambitions in no way impeding this symbolic role. As Merchant points out, organistic and
mechanistic ideologies are not entirely antithetical to one another, most societies contain
elements of both. It is the dominance of the mechanistic, with its tendency to produce
unrestrained ambitions and hubris, which proves dangerous. Elizabeth seems to possess a healthy
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combination of both lofty flights of intellectual fancy, and a ‗commonsense‘ fidelity to familial
duty. It is her grounding, first and foremost, in the sociability of a close knit family life which
tempers the unchecked drives that ruin Victor.
This reading may seem a bit thin given Elizabeth‘s lack of access to the opportunities that
ultimately devastate Frankenstein. Contrasted to Victor‘s single minded exploitation of the
material world, however, Elizabeth as a healthy – if unrealized – alternative to Enlightenment or
Romantic idealism seems more compelling, especially given Mary Shelley‘s own ambitions as a
writer, and the common association of Percy with Frankenstein – the latter‘s Utopian politics
both Mellor and Morton claim to be critiqued by the novel. Mellor states that at ―every level
Victor Frankenstein is engaged upon a rape of nature‖ (281). This characterization, if a bit
sensational, is largely accurate. Frankenstein‘s lack of a sense of community causes his
misfortune, and the misfortunes of those around him. He refuses to accept responsibility for his
Creature – initially after its creation, and later when he breaks his promise to create for it a mate
– forcing it to seek companionship elsewhere. Frankenstein also neglects his familial duties,
cutting off ties to his father and Elizabeth while pursuing his research, and is arguably complicit
in Elizabeth‘s death; so caught up is he in his own hostile relationship with his creation that he
proves incapable of conceiving the threat it poses to his fiancée. This critique espoused by
Mellor in her essay, however, neglects an essential aspect of the Creature‘s story: his anger
comes not merely from the specificity of being spurned by his creator, but humanity in general. It
is the inability of humans of all genders, creeds, and walks of life to acclimate themselves to the
existence of the Creature that is central to understanding the anxieties he evokes: anxieties
intimately tied to the novel‘s complex representation of the sublime.
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III
Leo Marx‘s brief description of the displacement of sublime awe from the deity, to nature
and finally to the technological intellect of man, is a compelling model to apply to Frankenstein.
The novel is full of often interconnected iterations of both natural and technological sublimes.
The flash of wonder young Victor experiences when a lightning bolt demolishes a tree on the
family estate is described in sublime terms: ―the thunder burst at once with frightful loudness
from various quarters of the heavens… I beheld a stream of fire issue from an old and beautiful
oak‖ (22-3). This bolt, exciting Victor‘s ―extreme astonishment,‖ is a compelling example of the
power of the natural world, which is quickly reigned by Victor‘s imagination through his father‘s
scientific explanation and subsequent replication of Benjamin Franklin‘s kite experiment, ―which
drew down that fluid from the clouds‖ (Shelley 23). It is this event, and the potential power it
evokes to be harnessed by the human mind, that finally expels the antiquated ideas of Cornelius
Aggrippa from Frankenstein‘s thoughts. This development outlines the movement of sublime
inspiration from nature to the seat of the technological mind described by Marx. The incident,
however, also contains a veiled suggestion of humanity‘s limited ability to control this power.
Though harnessed by Frankenstein senior, electricity in the form of lightning is still capable of
inflicting the chaotic destruction visited upon the oak. This ultimate lack of control over natural
forces foreshadows Victor‘s own inability to control the cascade of effects his manipulation of
nature sets forth: the monster he creates with the potential to tip the ecological balance of the
natural world into chaos.
Mellor refers to ecology in her analysis of Frankenstein, writing of a ―system of
interdependent organisms‖ (284). This comment, however, has more to do with how human
beings should act towards one another, emphasizing the community over the individual, the
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wants of others before those of the self, than it does humanity‘s place within an ecosystem. This
omission is of particular note, as the possibility of the Creature filling an ecological niche other
than, or in competition with, humanity seems of considerable importance to the text. As
addressed earlier, the constituent pieces of the Frankenstein monster were quite literally mined
from the earth, a process that in and of itself garners considerable rhetorical criticism within the
novel. Viewed in this manner, the Creature can be seen as a metaphor for the industrial process.
These raw materials, however, defy the intentions of their procurer, the Creature becoming
something altogether distinct from its constituent parts, and recalcitrant to its master‘s control.
Despite implying a ‗rebellion‘ of nature, the Creature‘s construction nonetheless represents the
developing trend of systematic assembly. This power and will to mass produce artificial
products is – if not unique – central to modern capitalism and mechanistic views of nature.
Victor‘s chemistry professor M. Krempe speaks to the glorification of the human mind driving
these processes: ―The labours of men of genius, however erroneously directed, scarcely ever fail
in ultimately turning to solid advantage for mankind‖ (28). Krempe is here reclaiming the legacy
of mystics like Agrippa, arguing for the benefits of their work even though the foundations of
their research were suspect. The sentiment contained within his defense, however, is concerned
more with modern institutions than medieval sorcerers; he believes modern science has imbued
thinking men with a boundless potential to understand and alter the material world, and that
ultimately nothing but good can come of it. Ignored by jubilant prognostications such as this are
the issues of sustainability and ethics: the impact of procuring materials for experimentation and
industrialization, the social changes that will be the product of this innovation, and the moral
obligations one might have to limit or prevent these unintended effects. The inability of
characters throughout Shelley‘s novel to reconcile themselves to the existence of Frankenstein‘s
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Creature implies an inability – either morally or functionally – to accept the implications of such
a Creature‘s presence, a problem not born of poor socialization, or the usurpation of God‘s
power of creation, but rather the complex ramifications the existence of such a Creature will
have upon the ecosystem in which he lives. The ends of innovation in this case, contrary to
Krempe‘s hypothesis, might not benefit humanity at all. Thus fear of the Creature can be seen in
terms not of humanity‘s ability to manipulate nature, but the inability for humanity to fully
anticipate the effects such manipulations will have, a product of nature‘s own unpredictability.
The idea of Frankenstein‘s Creature representing a chaotic nature is not entirely new. Bill
Philips, in his essay ―Frankenstein and Mary Shelley‘s ‗Wet Ungenial Summer,‘‖ claims that the
weather caused by the eruption of the Tambora volcano had particular impact on the writing of
Frankenstein. He argues the inordinately tempestuous effects of this eruption persisting
―throughout 1816 and 1817, when the novel was being written is… of great assistance to our
understanding of the work‖ (62). The weather, the caprices of nature, certainly play an important
role in Frankenstein. This combined with knowledge of the volcano leads Phillips to pose the
idea that ―rather than representing the horrors of the Industrial Revolution, Victor Frankenstein‘s
monster symbolizes the capacity of nature to instigate environmental crises of biblical
proportions‖ (59). He supports this claim by pointing to how storms are often concurrent with
appearances of the monster and the extreme environments he chooses to inhabit. He also brings
up the creature‘s relative indifference toward many of his victims, and the natural desolation
visited upon mainland Europe during the novel‘s composition. Ultimately, however, the essay
leaves the issue somewhat nebulous, setting up a potential link between the Creature and the
devastation caused by weather, while leaving the exact nature of this connection vague.
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Though a direct allegory between the weather and Creature of Shelley‘s novel may be
difficult to substantiate, the text does draw a strong connection between the monster and
environmental extremes. The ―flash of lightning‖ that coincides with Victor‘s sighting of his
creation following its murder of his brother, William, is but one example of the creature‘s
association with chaotic nature. Additionally, there is a striking resemblance between
Frankenstein‘s initial descriptions of the monster and those of Mont Blanc. He describes the
Creature‘s contradictory appearance:
His yellow skin scarcely covered the work of muscles and arteries beneath; his
hair was of a lustrous black, and flowing; his teeth of a pearly whiteness; but these
luxurances only formed a more horrid contrast with the watery eyes, that seemed
almost of the same colour as the dun white sockets in which they were set, his
shriveled complexion, and straight black lips. (Shelley 34)
In a similar fashion the harsh physical majesty of Mont Blanc is described: ―The sea, or rather
the vast river of ice, wound among its dependent mountains, whose aerial summits hug over its
recesses. Their icy and glittering peaks shone in the sunlight over the clouds‖ (Shelley 65).
Between these two passages the vivid description of how the myriad features of Victor‘s creation
contrast one another mirrors the material complexity of the mountain. The flowing arteries and
hair of the Creature are like the ice flows snaking through the range, and the pearly white teeth of
the monster are comparable to Mount Blanc‘s icy peaks jutting into the sky. Additionally, as the
constituent pieces of the Creature were ―mined‖ from different locations, the comparison
between creature and mountain implicitly evokes the vanes of minerals contained within the
peak. The idea of anyone scouring either the Creature or Mont Blanc for resources, however, is
unthinkable; both possess a power seemingly beyond that of mortal man. The majesty of the
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mountain range is described: ―white and shining pyramids and domes towered above all, as
belonging to another earth‖ (62). Similarly the Creature is described as being be of ―gigantic
stature… the deformity of its aspect‖ too hideous to belong to a human (48). Both the Creature
and the Alps possess a stature that dwarfs humanity, the monster adapting itself to environments
humans never could: ―he bounded over the crevices in the ice, among which I had walked with
caution‖ (Shelley 65).
Reading Percy Shelley‘s ―Mont Blanc‖ also proves instructive in the context of
Frankenstein. The poem describes the mountain as symbolizing ―the naked countenance of
earth,‖ the face of a primal nature whose power seemingly resides in a tranquility beyond the
rhythms of biological life to ―revolve, subside, and swell‖ (98, 95). This impression of an almost
transcendent majesty evoked by the natural sublime takes on greater significance for the reading
of Frankenstein when one considers the similarities between the sublime, if lesser, features that
surround the peak, amplifying one‘s experience of it, and the face of the monster itself. The
mountains and ice flows surrounding Mont Blanc are described by Percy as ―rude, bare, and
high, / Ghastly, and scarred, and riven‖ (70-1). In much the same fashion Mary writes of the
surrounding scenery: ―The surface is very uneven, rising like the waves of a troubled sea,
descending low, and interspersed by rifts that sink deep‖ (65). In both passages the verticality
and cracked asymmetry of the surrounding landscape is emphasized. The ocean-like movement
described in Mary‘s novel is also evoked in ―Mont Blanc‖: ―Thou art pervaded with that
ceaseless motion‖ (32).
Mary‘s descriptions of the Creature‘s face mirror this cracked and riven façade: ―His
jaws opened, and he muttered some inarticulate sounds, while a grin wrinkled his cheeks‖ (35).
Even during the innocence of his infancy, the Creature‘s face is distorted through its
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gesticulations, foreshadowing his eventual physical and emotional deformity: ―His countenance
bespoke bitter anguish, combined with disdain and malignity, while its unearthly ugliness
rendered it almost too horrible for human eyes‖ (65). The novel‘s emphasis on this visceral
malformation, caused in part through the Creatures affect, reflects the scared, otherworldly
landscape of the Alps, which both Mary and Percy notably contrast to a more beautiful
countryside tractable to everyday human life. Additionally, the Creature‘s stature is described as
―gigantic,‖ and he is more than once found ―hanging among the rocks of [a] nearly perpendicular
ascent,‖ paralleling how Mont Blanc towers over both its surrounding landscape as well as
human observers (48).
The animation of the Creature, and perceived animation of Mont Blanc, is another
notable point of comparison. Anticipation of the movement of that which should intuitively be
motionless, much like the almost perceptible churning of the rock and ice of the Alps, is what
Victor experiences as the lifeless flesh before him suddenly ―breathed hard, and a convulsive
motion agitated its limbs‖ (34). This is an important part of what makes the Creature so
unnerving. The depiction of Mont Blanc as emotive – in both Percy‘s poem and in the novel – is
what infuses the natural world with an impression of agency, an impression which seems to be
lost in the fever of Victor‘s experimentation, only to resurface as the inanimate materials used to
construct the Creature lurch to life, its erratic motions metaphorically setting forth the initial
stones of the avalanche which will inevitably consume Victor‘s life – as well as the Creature‘s
own. Thus, the transcendent/superhuman attributes ascribed to both peak and creature imply a
greater force lying behind them, yet one that is assessable through their physical incongruities. It
is this power that Percy Shelley reveres and – in line with Mary‘s critique of her husband –
Victor comes to abhor.
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Percy goes so far in his reverence for the awe Mont Blanc evokes as to politicize it,
arguing the Mountain contains truths ―to repeal / Large codes of fraud and woe; not understood /
By all, but which the wise, and great, and good / interpret, or make felt, or deeply feel (80-3).
Though an ardent atheist, Percy nonetheless here appeals to a higher order to ground his political
socialism, finding inspiration in the sublimity of the material world and its capacity to commit an
―unremitting interchange‖ with the human mind (39). Mirroring the force, if not the tenor, of this
exchange is the face of Frankenstein‘s freshly animated creature, ―No mortal could support the
horror of that countenance,‖ transforming the power of this natural sublime into a moment of
terror rather than reverence 10(35).
Indeed, additional support for the connection between Victor‘s world altering aspirations
and Percy Shelley‘s politics can be found in the passage from ―Mont Blanc‖ detailing how the
mind, quickened by the sights and sounds of the mountain, comes to reside ―in the still cave of
the witch Poesy‖ evoking images of ghosts and phantasms to represent the ephemeral and
capricious workings of the imagination (44). Given the textual similarities between ―Mont
Blanc‖ and Frankenstein, and the ambivalence Mellor and Morton – among others – have noted
Mary as feeling for her husband‘s politics, as well as those of her parents, it seems more than a
small coincidence that the fruit of Victor‘s own fevered labors would yield not metaphorical
phantasms, but a real one: the Creature, which – as Montag observes – is rich with its own
political connotations. In both cases the striving to do good through the modeling/studying of the
natural world – the inspiration Percy draws from Mont Blanc, and Victor‘s devotion to the
natural sciences – arguably distances them from their own immanence within this world.
Frankenstein, the mechanist, strives erroneously to assert absolute dominion over nature, and
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Percy distances himself from his ―familial affections‖ – and Mary in particular – to intellectually
pursue his own grandiose aspirations for society.
The judgment implicit in this textual connection, however, is far from absolute. Not only
does Mary‘s description of the sublimity of Mount Blanc carry with it a recuperative connotation
– Frankenstein seeming to draw strength from sight of the mountain – it also impresses upon the
imagination a raw power that confronts the human subject, unnerves it. This experience of awe, a
vastness that induces both pleasure and pain in the viewer, evokes the untenable fact of
humanity‘s fantasy of maintaining control over nature; whether that control be the types
domination seen in the industrial revolution, or simply the ability to maintain sole influence over
the course of one‘s life. Though certainly capable of fostering human ambitions – for instance
Romantic poetry and experimentation – the natural sublime also tends to limit this bolstering of
the ego; the ability of the rational mind to assert itself against the threatening power it perceives,
continues to be haunted by this power external to the self. It is only with the development of a
technological sublime – concomitant with industrialization, and often politicized11 – that the awe
traditionally ascribed to nature fully loses its normative potential, and human ambitions are
allowed to roam unchecked.
This fear of a chaotic nature is addressed by Merchant – though she merges it with more
beneficent views of a holistic nature – and also by William Cronon when he points out traditional
notions of wilderness were those of a place ―to which one came only against one‘s will, and
always in fear and trembling‖ (Cronon 71). This conception of wilderness would transform in the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries into notions of a ―pristine sanctuary‖ where one finds reprieve
from the corrupting influences of civilization (69). It is no coincidence that this idea of nature as
a sanctuary developed alongside the faith in humanity‘s ability to control the material world
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expressed by Frankenstein and Dr. Krempe; wilderness can only be invitingly quaint once it
seems possible for humanity to dominate it.
Victor‘s visit to the Alps is motivated by the very drive Cronon describes. Urged to
travel to the Alps by family members he readily agrees due to his hidden desire to recover from
the rigors of his studies, the creation of the monster, and his secret complicity in the deaths of
William and Justine. Just as Victor appears to have derived some solace from this mountain
retreat, however, the Kantian move inward perhaps steadying him against the difficulties of his
recent experiences, the creature bounds back into the narrative, the return of the natural sublime
now articulated as the inescapable specter of his inability to fully account for the ramifications of
his actions. This connection between the Creature and a capricious, uncontrollable nature is
essential to the text. Jean-François Lyotard, in The Inhuman, riffing off the work of both
Immanuel Kant and Edmund Burke, localizes this sense of unease in a moment of what he and
Burk term ―privation‖: ―the threat of nothing further happening… privation of light, terror of
darkness; privation of others, terror of solitude;… privation of life, terror of death‖ (Lyotard 99).
In the traditional (pre 20th century) sublime this moment of privation is inevitably followed by a
moment of recovery, a re-establishing or stabilizing of the self or ego whose existence was
implicitly threatened by the impression of privation. For Lyotard‘s postmodern sublime,
however, this second moment of reconciliation does not exist, a change in the theorization of
sublime that will be further tracked in my second chapter. This change is worth noting in the
context of Frankenstein though, precisely because it reflects back upon the transition from a
natural to a technological sublime. Unlike the natural sublime, which implies an order external to
the human world, even as this external world threatens the subject, the technological sublime
begins to conceive of the observing mind as the absolute organizing principle. When order is no
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longer seen as deriving from God or the natural world, the potential failures of this mind become
a sort of abject; the privation of order is the fear of chaos, loss of control, helplessness. Victor in
his eagerness to create a new species fails to consider the cascade effects the existence of such a
creature will have upon the tightly ordered world in which he lives. This is the veiled anxiety the
creature represents: the unpredictability of nature, the ever present possibility of
biological/material systems, whether through direct human influence or not, to produce
something new threatening one‘s existence, a threat no longer attached to the impression of a
transcendental order to creation. This fear extends beyond Frankenstein to the rest of humanity,
whose celebration of the Enlightenment seeks to disavow, even as it overwrites, the ―organistic‖
conceptions Merchant describes as presenting an alternative impression of purposivness in which
to take solace.
Though natural formations like the Alps or the great ice sheets of the arctic evoke this
fear of a chaotic nature, and thus a similar sense of the sublime, it is the closeness of the Creature
to the human subject that belies the potential for a recuperative moment. Frankenstein describes
the comparative horror of the Creature animate and inanimate: ―I gazed on him while unfinished;
he was ugly then; but when those muscles and joints were rendered capable of motion, it became
a thing such as even Dante could not have conceived‖ (Shelley 35). It is not until the creature
begins to move, attaining its ultimate uncanny similarity to man that Frankenstein realizes the
full extent of what he is doing, what he has done, and horror is allowed to set in. The
intractability of nature takes on an aspect that the human subject cannot distance itself from. Like
the technological sublime, the Creature is too close to humanity to allow for the process of
aesthetic recuperation to take place, and yet too different to be empathized with as a fellow
member of the species. For its part, all the Creature desires is a place, the ability to find relative
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equilibrium within its environment and to procreate; both of which are categorically denied the
Creature by Frankenstein and humanity as a whole.
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Chapter 2
Philip K. Dick‘s Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? possesses a striking if bizarre
ecological consciousness. From descriptions of the surreal, ―almost funny‖ extinctions of the
owls and their avian kin, to the dilapidation of San Francisco‘s urban environments and the
wastes that surround them, Dick‘s Earth is a site of rapidly accelerating environmental ruin.
Paired with this spatial disintegration is the psychological and ontological confusion Dick is well
known for amongst Science Fiction readers for creating in his texts. The connection between
these phenomena should not be overlooked. Just as the natural grandeur of the romantic sublime
permeates many of Frankenstein’s landscapes, a similar awe emanates from Dick‘s nearly vacant
San Francisco. Androids reflects, however, a very different sublime. Rather than representing the
majesty of a natural world which, even as it rebukes humanity‘s hubris, presents a profound and
meaningful existence beyond the human, Dick‘s environments seem to negate exactly this
possibility. Not only does the novel present the potential extinction of humankind, but even
greater a conceivable end to all life. Dick‘s fictions are, however, never without potential
horizons and, as Fredric Jameson has observed, any apocalyptic reading of Dick‘s work misses
the fact that the ―inveterate reader gradually comes to the conclusion that Dick revels in the
misery and impoverishment of these landscapes‖ (Jameson ―History and Salvation‖ 381). Thus if
one is to read a disparaging iteration of the sublime as the central aesthetic of Do Androids
Dream of Electric Sheep? one must also account for what balances this aesthetic out; what opens
the possibilities seemingly denied by a dying Earth, and just as discouraging as the possibilities
contained the colonization of a dead Mars?
The answer to this question, I believe, is rooted in the same potential found in Shelley‘s
Frankenstein: a human capacity – however differently articulated, and tinged with nihilistic
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sentiments – for community. The deep-seated concern symbolized by the recurrent figure of the
android in Dick‘s fiction is the negation of this potential, a negation seemingly immanent within
the current direction of human history. The philosophical dilemma posed by the android has been
theorized in a number of ways. Jameson compares it to Cartesian doubt, with what he terms the
―android cogito,‖ or the doubting not of one‘s senses, but the integrity of one‘s consciousness as
human: ―I think, therefore I am an android‖ (374). Similarly Carl Freedman sees the androids as
representing a justifiable paranoia linked to the development of capitalist institutions in his
Psychoanalytic/Marxist reading of Dick‘s Ubik, and Rric Rabkin links the androids to the
dehumanizing rationalization process of industrialization12. Common to each of these
interpretations is the specter of corporatism, a force the androids are indelibly tied to and which
I, in the context of my overarching aesthetic theorization, would like to link to Jameson‘s own
conceptualization of the postmodern or technological sublime. This aestheticization of
conspiracy and imagistic superficiality both permeates the text of Androids and is linked to
another form of the sublime: Lyotard‘s theory of privation, realized through a vision of entropic
infinity and symbolized in the destruction of Earth‘s ecological systems. The presence of a void
or silence, both aggressive and pervasive in the novel, is indicative of this privation: an entropic
vision of the universe wherein everything must eventually submit to decay. Premonitions of this
inevitable material ruin emanate not only from the novel‘s decimated landscapes but from the
androids themselves, who, even as they attempt to make a place for themselves on Earth prove –
at least for the time being – incapable of forging the types of communities necessary for
generating long term forms of cultural meaning: the traditions and ethical institutions which
define human civilizations.
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The connection between this ecological/entropic sublime and its postmodern counterpart
in the novel is complex. The paradox of the postmodern sublime, or more specifically the
bureaucratic and economic institutions that inaugurate its inception into the collective
consciousness, is that they simultaneously create a system of meaning that covers up the
scientifically established universal tendency towards decay, while hegemonically reinforcing the
positivism which makes the terms of this ruin ontologically absolute – the purpose of life
becomes the pursuit of goods and commercial gains supporting an ostensibly boundless culture
of consumerism that is, nonetheless, founded upon principles that prefigure its eventual
destruction. The locus of these postmodern aesthetic experiences notably contrasts theories of an
American Technological Sublime articulated by scholars like Leo Marx, David Nye and Rob
Wilson, all of whom describe a cultural sublime markedly distinct from its European
counterparts in its capacity to create a collective ebullience for the possibilities of technological
and social progress largely devoid of the terror or ego diminution described by Burke and Kant.
According to Wilson, the inspiration drawn from the vast expanses of tractable land in the
Americas was ideologically matched – until the modern era – only by the ―New World
affirmations of power, excess, newness, wildness, that sublime ‗influx‘ whereby nature was fast
transfigured into the makings of self-possibility and the market‖ (25). This story of American
progressivism, however, culminates in the production of its own Frankenstein monster; its
ideological immolation in the nuclear age. The post-apocalyptic world of Do Androids Dream
evokes not so much the terrible and ultimate semiotic articulation of the atomic mushroom cloud,
but the confrontation with scientific entropy such a conflagration implies. The landscapes of
Androids evoke neither the technological sublime, defined by expansive tracts of exploitable
wilderness and inspiring generations of American inventers and poets, entrepreneurs and
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explorers, nor are they the terrible yet rejuvenating visages of Frankenstein’s Romantically
Sublime Alps; rather they symbolize the utter negation of human possibility, a postmodern
privation which seemingly forestalls any recourse to an egotistical turn inward for individual
deliverance.
Against the threat of these landscapes, and the chaotic infinity they evoke, stands the
cultish religion of Mercerism, a spiritual unity realized through a mechanically facilitated
experience of communal suffering, joy, and hope for redemption. This redemption, however, is
not transcendental like Christianity‘s – though Mercerism does possess a number of Christian
overtones – but rather facilitates the spiritualization of the process of corporeal living, providing
life with meaning beyond positivist rationalism. This chapter will argue that Androids posits this
―spiritualization‖ of life as being necessary to the foundation of an ethical society, which must
look to the maintenance of a long term vision of community even as this community faces
impending destruction13. This spiritualization of life is akin to the holism described by Carolyn
Merchant as an ―oganistic‖ vision of nature, and theorized in Murry Bockchin‘s anti-hierarchical
social ecology – both of which ascribe meaning to the physical world beyond mere
instrumentalism, while attempting to remain free of transcendental spiritual idealizations.
Though ephemeral, this type of biologically – and perhaps mechanically – inspired meaning
drives the dim hope of new possibilities in the novel.
I.
Any attempt to theorize Dick‘s androids, especially in the context of Do Androids Dream
of Electric Sheep?, must address Lejla Kucukalic‘s insightful essay ―Mechanical Universe and
Its Discontents.‖ Though she is not the first critic to problematize interpretations of the android
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as humanity‘s sinister alter – Aaron Barlow has written another notable essay on the subject
entitled ―Philip K. Dick‘s Androids: Victimized Victimizers‖ – her work on the subject is by far
the most comprehensive and compelling. Rather than seeing the android as part of a nexus of
deprivations facing a harassed humanity in Dick‘s novel, Kucukalic reads them as inextricably
aligned with their creators against the inevitability of ruin:
the general tide of nothingness, of deserted radiation-devoured landscapes, is
reflected in the existential crisis of both Rick Deckard and the androids, who
teeter on the disconcerting edge between life and death but also have a limited
expiration date (Kucukalic 87)
Kucukalic reads the imminent mortality of the androids as linking them to the concerns of their
human creators. She also detects echoes of science writer Norbert Wiener, who she establishes as
an inspiration for Dick‘s fiction. Wiener‘s writings on cybernetics and entropy both presuppose
the potential development of a slave-like race of machines – Dick‘s androids – and the ability of
these machines, like humans to ―counter act the disorder of entropy‖ (Kucukalic 85). This
common alignment of both human and machine against entropy, argues Kucukalic, makes the
subjecthood of the androids just as important as those of the novel‘s human characters. She
bolsters this conclusion by pointing to Deckard‘s conflicted role as ―killer,‖ humanity‘s
responsibility for the lack of empathy possessed by the androids, and finally the movement of
Deckard‘s redemption, eventually leading him to adopt a simulated toad accepting that, ―electric
things have their lives, too‖ (Dick 239). Ultimately, Kucukalic argues Dick‘s derisive statements
in interviews about what his androids symbolize – often mobilized to interpret the novel – apply
not to these human simulacrum, but instead symbolize ― human beings who do not care what
happens to their fellow human beings,‖ androids ostensibly included (Kucukalic 88).
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Kucukalic‘s essay is a convincing and well-researched response to numerous less
nuanced interpretations of Androids, a set of responses that I cannot hope to fully summarize
here. I would like to argue, however, that her reading of the novel is somewhat selective,
marginalizing many of the more ambivalent scenes about the androids. To begin with, the
androids, though occasionally presented as sensitive to the environmental ruin visited upon Earth
– and the inevitability of decay it evokes – are themselves often semiotically clustered with
entropy; for instance being described as reflecting the lifeless void of space. Additionally, though
Dick‘s human simulacra unquestionably make moral demands upon both his human characters
and readers for collective and individual recognition, the complexity of the androids as textual
symbols rests in their ambiguity as moral subjects. Arguably victims of a dehumanizing
manufacturing process which circumscribes their identities, the androids and their interests, as
often as not, seem to be tied to these corporate mechanisms. The titular conceit of Aaron
Barlow‘s essay, ―Victimized Victimizers,‖ implies that the androids are simultaneously merciless
predators and hapless prey: victims of the system that created them and the prejudices of the
public they were made to serve. What both Kucukalic and Barlow – who also takes a
sympathetic stance on the androids – fail to acknowledge, however, is that while the novel
constantly presents both horizons and demands for the subjecthoods of the androids, it almost
immediately problematizes or closes out these possibilities. For example, Rachael Rosen‘s
capricious murder of Deckard‘s goat is incomprehensible to the novel‘s human characters, but,
as Deckard observes, was ―not needless‖ as it was motivated by ―an android reason‖ (Dick 225).
This scene importantly draws a dividing between humans and androids – though this simple
binary is constantly problematized throughout the novel. Rachael‘s actions were motivated by
selfish revenge, either for the murder of her fellow androids, or perhaps more compelling – given
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her ostensible lack of concern for her compatriots – the fact that, in her words ―you love the goat
more than me‖ (Dick 200). Though these motivations are far from inconceivable in humans, they
do belie the ideal of ―humanity‖ put forth in the novel by faith in Mercerism: an abiding respect
for all living things, though excluding – at least for Deckard – androids. The murder is thus
considered inhuman in the context of the novel – both for its characters, and readers who have
bought into the distinction between man and machine the text outlines – foreclosing any feelings
of sympathy readers previously felt for Rachael; sentiments already confused by her calculated,
if purpose driven, seduction of Deckard in order to inhibit his ability to hunt other androids. The
killing of the goat, and the alien motivations behind it, evoke an oft felt mood of paranoia in the
novel; a motif commonly noted in Dick‘s fiction by critics like Christopher Palmer, Carl
Freeman and Kucukalic herself.14 Fostering this atmosphere is the recurrent inability of readers
to rationally comprehend the motivations of the novel‘s antagonists.
Behind Rachael‘s actions stands the shadowy figure of the Rosen Association, the
manufactures of the Nexus 6 android – the model to which Pris belongs – and whose vague
presence can be felt throughout the narrative. Rachael speaks of her mission to demoralize
Deckard as planned by ―the association.‖ This is reflected in the following passages wherein she
refers repeatedly to the company as a nebulous ―we:‖
We tried to stop you this morning, before you started out with Dave Holden‘s list.
I tried again, just befor Polokov reached you. But then after that I had to wait.‖
…‖Oh, so Phil accompanied you back to the opera house. We didn‘t know that;
our communications broke down about then. We knew just that she had been
killed; We naturally assumed it was you.‖ …‖The association,‖ Rachael said,
―wanted to reach the bounty hunters here and in the Soviet Union. (Dick 197)

Schneeberger 48

Though charged with protecting her fellow androids, Rachael speaks of their deaths
conversationally, and in particular comments on the recent murder of her professed friend, Luba
Luft, ―we just knew she had been killed; we naturally assumed it was you,‖ without a hint of
agitation or sorrow. To Rachael the protection of her fellow androids is simply a job given her by
the association; in manifesting this attitude Rachael displays the lack of empathy Dick‘s androids
are notorious for. Not only is Rachael in contact with the rogue androids, so too, it appears, is the
manufacturer that created them. The constant and ambiguous use of the pronoun ―we‖ as
Rachael explains her motivations to Deckard, seemingly referring to the Rosen Association and
rogue androids interchangeably, obfuscates where the reach of the company ends and the
independent actions of their creations begin. This confusion has wide ranging effects upon the
reading of the novel. This inability to distinguish between creature and company implicates the
association in incidents like Deckard‘s apprehension by a fake police agency made up of escaped
androids who accuse Deckard himself of being an impostor; a moment designed to ontologically
confuse the reader who momentarily questions the fidelity of the prior narration.
The direct role the Rosen Association plays in Rachael‘s actions, and her lack of concern
for her fellows, push Kucukalic‘s reading beyond its ability to disassociate the androids from the
sinister corporation that created them. Though it is unquestionably human designs, and
―deliberately built in defects‖ – particularly their lack of empathy – that defines the evolution of
the androids, and in many ways curse them, it is difficult to disassociate these creatures – as both
Kucukalic and Barlow attempt – from the interests of the global and interplanetary conspiracies
of the novel (Dick 183). Eldon Rosen, the Association‘s lead researcher, makes the driving force
behind the increasing complexity of androids clear: ―the time-honored convention underlying
every commercial venture,‖ dedication to the whims of the market, and little else (Dick 52). The
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androids are inextricably connected to these economic forces, that define not only their
manufacture and development, but whose interests also seem indistinguishable from their own.
This cabalistic network of economic and bureaucratic entities, nebulously intertwined with the
androids, evokes Jameson‘s conception of the postmodern technological sublime: a powerful
aesthetic sense of artificiality combined with a fear of conspiracies. These feelings, according to
Jameson, are the product of the difficulties individuals have comprehending the ―totality of the
contemporary world system,‖ that of late capitalism (Jameson, ―Postmodernism‖ 218). The
Earth‘s destruction was ostensibly brought about by these systemic forces: the ―Pentagon and its
smug scientific vassal the Rand Corporation‖ that sang the praise of inevitable American triumph
in the impending war with the Soviet Union (Dick 13).
Jameson‘s postmodern sublime, however, is more than classic aesthetic notions like the
terror of Edmund Burke‘s ―obscurity,‖ or a Kantian insufficiency of representational
―comprehension,‖ applied to an inability to understand modern institutional systems. A pervasive
sense of artificiality, the product of everything from modern art, to architecture, to mass media,
informs a glossy and prepackaged superficiality:
The technology of contemporary society is therefore mesmerizing and fascinating
not in its own right, but because it seems to offer some privileged representational
shorthand for grasping a network of power and control even more difficult for our
minds and imaginations to grasp – namely the whole new decentered global
network of the stage of capital itself. This is a figural process presently best
observed in a whole mode of contemporary entertainment literature, which one is
tempted to characterize as ―high-tech paranoia,‖ in which the circuits and
networks of some putative global computer hook-up are narratively mobilized by
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labyrinthine conspiracies of autonomous but often deadly interlocking and
competing information agencies in a complexity often beyond the capacity of the
normal reading mind (Jameson, ― Postmodernism‖ 218 ).
Dick‘s fiction, which so fascinated Jameson, was a precursor to this ―entertainment literature.‖
Androids presents a bottomless pit of deepening paranoia, accentuated by the ontological
confusion of scenes like the one where readers suspect Deckard himself of being an android, or
when the discredited religious figure Mercer – in reality out of work television actor Al Jarry –
pops messianicly out of the ether to provide spiritual guidance. In conjunction with this
conspiratorial mode comes the mindless consumerism of the novel‘s human characters: the
recreational use of the affect altering mood organ, Iran Deckard and John Isidore‘s seemingly
constant consumption of television, and arguably the existence of the empathy boxes through
which fusion with Mercer is achieved. All of these mediums are indicative of the type of
representational malaise described by Jameson, behind which stands the hegemony of an as yet
unrecognized power.
The most compelling example of the artificiality of these mediums, and the ways in
which they are tied to the androids, is the television comic Buster Friendly. Buster, and his
tirelessly rotating cast of witty and sexually provocative guests, is revealed by Irmgard Batty to
be ―one of us [an android]…And nobody knows. No humans, I mean‖ (Dick 209). Here again an
ambiguity is presented as to the full extent of android duplicity in, and perhaps even control over,
the novel‘s events. Even Isidore‘s boss, the cantankerous and wise Hannibal Sloat, has ―never
been able to determine… for sure‖ Buster‘s identity (Dick 74). If, as Barlow asserts, those
―behind Buster Friendly – and not the androids – are the real ―evil‖ force in the novel,‖ it is
notable that the narrative makes no effort to disassociate Buster from these forces. Indeed, for
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readers they are ostensibly one in the same; Buster becomes yet another signifier for the mass of
global conspiracies seemingly operating behind the text.
Whether puppet or puppeteer, the novel makes it clear that Buster is fighting with
Mercerism ―for control of our [humanity‘s] psychic souls‖ (Dick, 74). Buster, the ―forty-six
hour‖ a day television comic, is the ultimate fetishization of the image in this devastated future
(Dick 74). Friendly and his guests are always funny, always vivacious, and most importantly
always young: ―Buster is immortal, just like Mercer,‖ Sloat shrewdly observes (Dick 74).
Despite the androids‘ four year lifespan, a problem of the inability to achieve artificial ―cell
replacement,‖ the Buster show has run for years, non-stop, producing more content than any
human could ever conceivably watch (Dick 195). Android copies, ―stamped out like bottle caps,‖
produce this facile image of eternal youth. ―The Buster Friendly Show‖ is not the product of a
particularity but a sinister multiplicity, the endless duplication of identical facsimiles simulating
eternal youth and masquerading as an unachievable fantasy invading humanity‘s collective
consciousness. In a world where decay has become an inescapable truth of everyday life, Buster
Friendly beams to audiences the perpetual image of its antithesis – a boundless and self
possessed vitality.
Immortality is also ascribed to Mercer. The connections between Buster Friendly and the
religion of Mercerism are many. Both Mercerism and ―The Buster Show‖ rely upon mechanical
mediums – televisions and empathy boxes respectively – both play a large formative role in
defining the consciousness of society, and both are predicated upon falsehoods – Buster‘s
identity as an android and Mercer‘s as Al Jarry. These similarities, however, belie an important
distinction; while television is a one-way experience – broadcasting information to passive
viewers – the empathy boxes constitute an active connection between participants who share
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their emotions (positive and negative) with one another in a form of collective catharsis. This
collectivism facilitates community formation – the ability of biological systems to hold off the
inevitability of entropic ruin, and the ethical institutions that provide a normative grounding for
society despite this universal inclination towards decay. Conversely, experiences like ―The
Buster Show‖ offer an imitation or alternative to this type of community: the reflection of
commodified wants as defined by commercialism and continually rebroadcast back to viewers
through their televisions, or the use of the mood organ, which produces a self-referential
feedback of wants and desires mediated through the emotion generating device.
Television and the mood organ notably mimic the inward turn necessary for ego
recovery in Kant‘s dynamic sublime, both allowing for the recourse to an interior ideal in
response to an external threat. In the case of the Kantian sublime this appeal is to the cagegorical
imperatives: the recognition of a higher moral order to which the corporeal existence of the
individual is secondary. For the characters of Androids this recourse is to the self-referential
textuality of television narratives, creating a simulacrum of lived experiences that is ostensibly
boundless and self perpetuating. This comparison is all the more compelling when one considers
the themes of escapism that surround these devices in the novel, as instanced by Iran Deckard‘s
description of silence after turning off her television: ―although I heard the emptiness
intellectually, I didn‘t feel it‖ (Dick 3). Iran fails to feel this emptiness because she is at this
moment under the influence of the mood organ which, like the television she shuts off, provides
a means though which to escape having to respond directly to the material world15. Rather,
proscribed sensations, and by extension responses, are fed into her. The sensory tools through
which beings typically enter a dialectical relationship with objects – making judgments about,
and reacting to their environment – are duped into responding to content negative stimuli, to
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emotional signs to which there are no real world referents, what Jean Baudrillard would term the
―hyperreal.‖ Though operating differently from the sublime moment of ego recovery – in the
face of a terror inducing object (in Lyotard‘s terms the possibility of nothing further happening)
the recourse of the subject is not to reflect upon its own ethical superiority, but instead to
affectively disarm the experience entirely – the results are the same, the individual inevitably,
and in extreme cases nearly exclusively, reflects upon their own interior experience, withdrawing
from the material/social world. Alternatively, Mercerism, though a similar pre-manufactured
experience, directs the attentions of its practitioners outward. Not only is fusion a communal
experience, encouraging users to recognize and understand the wants and drives of others, it also
transforms the human devastation of the Earth into a parable constantly reflecting the dire state
of nature.
Kucukalic erroneously clusters these experiences together – Mercerism and ―The Buster
Show‖ – arguing they collectively display both the redemptive potential of technology, and its
capacity to achieve the same ethically driven agency which defines humanity in the novel. The
closed, one way relationship between viewers and Buster, however, denies the possibility of
progress. This passive, anesthetizing relationship belies the dialectical capacity of communities
to deal with ever evolving social and environmental issues, the ability of communicative actors
to mediate between differing perspectives in order to progressively reach a common
understanding/agreement – as per Habermas‘ ―ideal speech community‖. Instead Buster offers a
prepackaged commodity that simultaneously distracts its viewers from the devastation
surrounding them, while speciously reinforcing ideas of the sustainability of the status-quo.
Though the ethical horizon Kucukalic envisions for the androids is indeed implied in the novel –
the Rosen Association‘s efforts to create androids indistinguishable from humans, narrating a
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process slowly blurring the line between humanity and machines – it seems more of a distant
possibility than a realized truth. If, as Kucukalic suggests, technology stands as what Jurgen
Habermas would term a ―norm free block of sociality,‖ neither good nor evil but deriving its
ethical content from its relationship to society, then it is the fine distinctions in its
conceptualization and usage that ultimately define technology‘s ethical valence. Thus, when
comparing ―The Buster Friendly Show‖ to Mercerism – both of which signify a blending of
human and machine – it is essential to note that the evolution of the latter has unquestionably
been perverted by the systemic institutions from which the android seems – if not irredeemably –
inseparable.
Mechanistic thinking – to use Merchant‘s terminology – is what leads to this perversion.
Bookchin addresses much the same issue when he contrasts different cultural notions of what he
terms ―technice‖ – the current mode of capitalist production versus a more holistic vision of the
labor process supposedly found in tribal societies and antiquity, as does Theodor Adorno with
his critique of instrumentalism. Each of these thinkers, along with countless others, attempt to
isolate what they perceive as a lost ethical dimension (animism for Bookchin, oganistic
perspectives for Merchant, and mimesis for Adorno) in the relationship between subjects and
objects engendered by the efficacy of scientific and technological progress. These forces, they
argue, have become nearly absolute paradigms in the modern world. That is not to say, however,
that the ―promise‖ of technological advancement and historically driven progress are necessarily
irredeemable in their eyes. Rather, Bookchin argues that ―the grim fatalism [regarding
technology] slowly permeating western humanity‘s response to technics derives in large part
from its ethical ambivalence toward technical innovation‖ (Bookchin 220). According to
Bookchin, Capitalism controls the direction of ‗innovation‘ – not technology itself – and is thus
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the vector of modern ethical decline: ―The state is not merely a constellation of bureaucratic and
coercive institutions. It is also a state of mind, an instilled mentality for ordering reality,‖ one
that insists upon domination of, rather than a communal sensitivity to, nature. (Bookchin 94).
That Bookchin establishes this vision of ―technice‖ as a mode of thought, rather than something
immanent within technology itself is a notable difference between him and other ecological
thinkers. David Watson, for example, argues ―technological arrangements themselves generate
social change and shape human action,‖ directly linking technology to the ecological and social
problems of modernity (213). Bookchin believes human interventions in the environment can be
positive if driven by the ‗evolutionarily normative‘ order of the natural world to which humanity
belongs – and ‗primitive‘ societies were more in tune – whereas for Watson these interventions
are themselves the problem.
The distinction between these views is important to an ecological analysis of Androids,
given the novel‘s ambivalent treatment of technology. A sinister rationality typifies the androids
and their manufactures, as well as the war profiteers and superpowers of the novel – progenitors
of nuclear holocaust. This destructive potential is contrasted by the androids‘ own capacity for
redemption – the possibility that the efforts to make androids indistinguishable from humans will
lead to their development as ethical subjects – and what Jameson observes is a distinct lack of
dystopian edge in Dick‘s fiction; never do his novels, despite their often bleak themes and
settings, foreclose humanist possibilities. No matter how bad this mechanically driven world
seems, there is always a capacity for hope, hope that, given the Earth‘s barren state will likely
involve some sort of technological innovation, perhaps even the potentially harmonious bridging
of man and machine Jameson notes at the end of Martian Time-Slip: here ―Dick‘s salvational
instinct finds its raw material and its nourishment in the most depressing of his novelistic
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‗realities:‘‖ the fusion of the autistic Manfred to a network of mechanisms keeping him alive ―all
tubes and hoses trailing behind, into the alternate dreamtime of another History and another
present‖ (Jameson, History and Salvation in Philip K. Dick 383). Though perhaps not the most
sanguine image of humanity‘s future, Jameson‘s interpretation of Manfred evokes Donna
Haraway‘s assertion in her ―Cyborg Manifesto‖ that changing conceptions of human
materiality/reality represent new libratory possibilities for humanity as much as the potential for
repression, or the closing out of traditional ways of knowing/being. Regardless of whether
moments like this represent possible salvation, or simply a stoic maintenance of sentient
existence carrying on a little longer no matter the form, it is clear that if one is to read Dick‘s
fiction as an attack upon advanced technologies, this attack must be upon those that are
institutionally bound to a corrupt social system.
Watson‘s concerns about technology, however, do find voice in the novel. The idea of
certain technologies having innately ill effects upon those that use them certainly resonates with
Deckard‘s moral conundrums about the androids. A product of ethically neutral economic forces,
the androids seem to instill in the bounty hunters who pursue them an ethically neutral mandate
to kill, suggesting that it is the very utilitarian processes of usage and production that created the
androids, necessary for realizing advanced industrial states, which are fundamentally
dehumanizing. The government‘s role in nuclear proliferation and war heedless of its
environmental impacts, the Rosen Association‘s dedication to market forces, and the
personification of the androids as purely analytical creatures are all indicative of a systemic
flattening of ethical/ecological considerations in the name of positivist efficacy. Whether this
flattening-out is ultimately the product of technology, and whether these same technologies
could play a role in the production of a more harmonious future is left unresolved; if as Deckard
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suggests mechanical things have their lives too, it is worth noting – whatever horizons they may
have – for now it is still considered a ―paltry‖ existence (Dick 239).
II.
Though Dick‘s androids may very well elude easy categorization or condemnation, his
economic and bureaucratic institutions are not so complex. Sacrificed by these entities are more
holistic and ethically fecund ideologies like those espoused by Bookchin and Merchant: the
concept of normativity being immanent within nature and not simply a product of human society
– the latter of which Bookchin terms ―second nature.‖ These ideas are symbolized by the
communalism of Mercer‘s empathy boxes, and the religion‘s high regard for all life16. The
ideologies critiqued by Bookchin and Merchant tend to reduce existence (human or otherwise) to
nothing more than a set of material relations, a concept that is particularly problematic in
Androids where material reality is no longer capable of supporting life. The logic of this
particular brand of rationalism17 is clustered with the privation elicited by the entopic and social
decay menacing humanity on both Earth and Mars. This brand of positivism has brought about
the ecological disaster, denying meaning to the natural world beyond its capacity to be measured
and put to industrial use. Though not the origin of these ideologies, the androids are a reflection
of the mentalities they represent.
The most troubling aspect of the androids is not their potential for violence, as humans
notoriously possess much the same capacity in Dick‘s fiction. Rather it is their inability to see
beyond their own survival, manifesting itself not only as a tendency for selfish behavior –
another trait common to humans – but as a willingness to give up living once their destruction is
assured. This resignation is described in Luba Luft:
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Her eyes faded and the color dimmed from her face, leaving it cadaverous, as if
already starting to decay. As if life had in an instant retreated to some point far
inside her, leaving the body to its automatic ruin. (Dick 129-30)
This retreat or winking out of life force is one of the things that troubles Deckard most about the
androids; their willingness to give in to the entropic inclinations of the universe. Though this
defeatism has begun to manifest itself in the novel‘s human characters, as instanced by the fear
of genetic mutation leading to a precipitous decline in birth rates on Earth, Luba Luft‘s
disturbingly comical switch between being an ostensibly vital creature to a lifeless mass serves
as an exaggerated reflection of humanity‘s own existential crisis. This resolution towards death
defies the human need to create a space of belonging within the environment that transcends
one‘s immediate existence. Long term ethical and moral institutions are difficult to maintain
within communities not capable of surviving the individual, and in this regard – despite whatever
aspirations Roy Batty might have to foster a similar sort of communalism – androids prove
entirely lacking. The threat of cultural ruin posed by nuclear devastation forces an inevitable
crisis point in the process of human reproduction, the android simultaneously representing both
the abject reality of humanity as an ephemeral occurrence, and the systemic cultural processes
that exacerbate this threat of mortality, making the terms it is predicated upon ontologically
absolute.
Kant‘s dynamic sublime is founded upon much the same anxiety; the awe inspired by an
outward threat to one‘s corporeal existence is overcome as the subject reassures him-or-herself
of the superiority of the categorical imperative: the ethical principles upon which their existence
as a moral being is founded and which – deriving from God – will continue to exist even as the
light of one‘s material existence is expunged. What is so disturbing about Luba Luft‘s
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willingness to die is not her ability to approach mortality with relative insouciance – indeed this
capacity is often revered in humans – but the fact that this willingness is not grounded in
ideological principles that transcend her being. Her death does not serve a practical purpose
within her community, nor does it affirm her own moral superiority as proof of her adherence to
a higher ideal. Rather, the terror of the dynamic sublime is allowed to proliferate unchecked. Luft
does not derive moral strength from her encounter with mortality, but psychologically shuts
down, suffering what might be described as a death of ego, before an almost atavistic fight or
flight reflex kicks in. Deckard‘s aversion to this characteristic of the Androids, however, is not
founded upon revulsion towards an utterly alien epistemology; it is a reaction to just how close
this response comes to the current state of the human condition as it is found in the novel.
The transcendental ethical grounding which defines the experience of Kant‘s dynamic
sublime becomes less stable as western society distances itself from Judeo-Christian models of
creation, moving towards an existentially harsh scientific rationalism. As David Nye points out
in American Technological Sublime, for the United States this sort of ethical grounding was
displaced only to become immanent within the will to technological innovation itself, the
progress of society seemingly linked to a boundless moral and cultural fecundity found in the
interface between an expansive wild and the seemingly endless technological process of
harnessing this wilderness for human betterment. Even if it did not entirely destroy this faith, the
nuclear age problematized this American conception of technology as a positive moral force; it
seemed no good could come of the atomic-bomb18. Though immediately a response to the
dissolution caused by atomic power, the existential fatalism expressed by Androids‘ characters
ultimately reflects what Bookchin argues is the tendency of science to claim a measurable
―orderliness in the form of a scientific logic‖ but to abstain on the possibility that ―logic and
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reason inheres in the world itself,‖ implying that no meaning worth recognizing exists beyond
the subject‘s ability to perceive it (Bookchin 235).
This almost solipsistic vision of nature – denying meaning to objects outside of their
ability to be measured – finds a disparaging mirror in the novel as Phil Resch and Deckard
contemplate Edvard Munch‘s painting ―The Scream:‖
Twisted ripples of the creature‘s torment, echoes of its cry, flooded out into the air
surrounding it; the man or woman, whichever it was, had become contained by its
own howl. It had covered its ears against its own sound. The creature stood on a
bridge and no one else was present; the creature screamed in isolation. Cut off by
– or despite – its outcry… ‗I think,‘ Phil Resch said ‗this is how an andy must
feel.‘ (Dick 128).
The novel‘s interpretation of ―The Scream‖ first emphasizes the anguish of the painting‘s
androgynous subject, physically manifested as the ripples produced by the figure‘s tortured cry.
These vocal emanations envelop or ―contain‖ the subject, implying its inability to extend itself
into the world surrounding it. Finally, the scene describes the attempt of the ―creature‖ to shield
itself from its own pained articulations, along with its social ―isolation.‖ The association of the
androids with this tortured being implies a disconnect between them and the world that surrounds
them.
Though it is Phil Resch – a less than trustworthy speaker – who comments on this
connection, the sentiment seems sincere to the novel. A similar scene is described in Dick‘s We
Can Build You as an android Lincoln first awakens to consciousness in a comparable moment of
existential terror:
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It was fear as absolute existence: the basis of its life. It had become separate,
yanked away from some fusion that we could not experience – at least, not now.
Maybe once we all had lain quietly in the fusion (72-3).
Here again in this earlier work, Dick depicts existential existence as particularly difficult for
androids. In this passage the creation of a self differentiated from the rest of being seems as
much a process of alienation as affirmation of a unique identity: the birth of consciousness is
likened to getting ―yanked‖ from a more holistic state of being – presumably the natural order
governing physical relations in the universe – and forced to violently turn against that holism so
as to substantiate individual identity. Humans and other organic beings seem to have adapted to
such deprivations, ―two billion years of pressure to live and evolve haranguing it‖ (Dick 198). A
sense of organic community seems as good an explanation as any for this adaptation – a
biological support system for our radically differentiated matter. Isidore acknowledges as much
when he realizes the importance of community after having long lived alone: ―You have to be
with other people, he thought. In order to live at all‖ (Dick 202). The significance of the empathy
boxes also reinforces this idea, as they foster a network of understanding and caring in the novel
just as this biological infrastructure – earth‘s ecology – is breaking down.
Communication may be a key word here, and Jameson makes an important observation in
this regard about another of Dick‘s novels, Dr. Bloodmoney. The novel‘s plot, Jameson argues,
pits two competing social orders against one another:
For it seems clear that the basic event envisaged by Dr Bloodmoney is the
substitution of the realm of language for the realm of things, the replacement of
the older, compromised world of empirical activity, capitalist everyday work and
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scientific knowledge, by the newer one of communication. (―After Armageddon‖
360)
Jameson points out that the overthrow of the mega-maniacal Bluthgeld by the psychokinetically
gifted Hoppy represents a process wherein one despot is inevitably replaced by another, Hoppy
taking Bluthged‘s place as the novel‘s antagonist. Both of these characters, according to
Jameson, are part of a semiotic cluster in the novel representing instrumentalism. Thus the
triumph of one over the other is ultimately the exchange of one form of domination for another,
following a sort of social Darwinism. As Jameson argues, it is only when representatives of the
second node of meaning within the text – linguistic communication – disarm Hoppy, that an
appropriate resolution can take place. In all three cases, Androids, We Can Build You and Dr.
Bloodmoney, a notion of community is raised from which subjects representing instrumentalism
– the artificially constructed androids or the machinations of the self serving Bluthgeld and
Hoppy – are excluded.
The distinction Jameson and Dick‘s novels draw between language and materialism
reflects the social theories espoused by Jurgen Habermas in his Theory of Communicative Action.
Habermas conceptualizes modern rationality as existing in several innately differentiated
spheres. The most important of these consist of ―instrumental‖ and ―communicative‖ rationality,
which correspond to the larger social spheres of ―system‖ and phenomenological ―lifeworld‖
respectively. The reification of systems takes place, he argues, when the instrumental rationality
of what he terms ―steering media‖ – money and power – begin to override linguistic
communications in the lifeworld, the lifeworld necessarily originating first in order for societies
to exist19. This form of reification seems particularly apt in the context of Jameson‘s reading of
Dr. Bloodmoney insofar as the instrumental control Bluthgeld and Hoppy assert over material
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reality allows them to destroy or conquer large sections of society, making power the dominant
form of social interaction in the novel. This model is also relevant to Androids. A central aspect
of Habermas‘ philosophy is his replacement of the monological conception of self inherited from
Decartes, with a dialogical/linguistic theory of identity formation. Grounded in a theory of
human evolution that argues linguistic cooperation must necessarily presuppose strategic actions
– those directed towards self-serving purposes – Habermas argues for the possibility of a
universal ethical grounding for humanity predicated upon the ability for speaking subjects to
move towards common ground, as well as generate new ethical content, through discourse.
Notably, though created by humans, the androids do not necessarily possess the same capacity
for reaching mutual understanding, the process of their ―evolution‖ differing substantially from
humanity‘s, and having been circumscribed by the systemic forces of the marketplace and the
necessities of the military industrial complex. The difference between humanity and the androids
can thus be defined by their lack of inclusion in a phenomenological lifeworld; they truly are
monological subjects who must face reality without this social support system.
The comparison between the androids and ―The Scream‖ illustrates this exclusion from
the lifeworld: androids are purely analytical beings cut off in Cartesian fashion from the physical
world – as expressed by their cruel, scientific dissection of the spider late in the novel,
considered a heinous act by human society – and lacking the divine spark (which Decartes as a
Christian presupposed) to tie them to one another. The novel describes this as a lack of empathy
– or in Habermas‘ terms communicative rationality – which would connect them to the world in
a manner other than observation: the horror of the figure in the painting who cannot perceive
meaning beyond his own ephemeral consciousness. Resch uses this comparison to assure himself
that he is not an android – which Deckard believes him to be – as he does not feel this way. The
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rapid ―evolution‖ of the android, however, driven by the Rosen Association‘s efforts to create
new models indistinguishable from humans, opens exactly the possibility Kucukalic and Barlow
suggest – the android as an ethical subject. The novel‘s constant invitations to both Deckard and
readers to sympathize with the androids represent an ethical conundrum: as feeling creatures they
seem to demand moral consideration, yet as beings still existing inextricably outside the bounds
of the human lifeworld, harmonious coexistence with the androids – at least in their current state
– seems an impossibility.
The difference, however, may only be a matter of degrees, or a few eons of evolution.
The scene of Lincoln‘s awakening suggests it is exactly the solipsistic terror represented in ―The
Scream‖ that humanity‘s distant ancestors overcame; an acclamation to being that does not
appear absolute. The desperate loneliness of ―The Scream‖ is felt emanating from the androids
by the novel‘s human characters. John Isidore‘s first impression of the android Pris Stratton is
tinged with a sense of sublime privation:
Something else began to emerge from her. Something more strange. And he
thought more deplorable. A coldness. Like, he thought, a breath from the vacuum
between inhabited words, in fact from nowhere (Dick 65)
An impression of a ‗coldness‘ or ‗vacuum‘ is common to descriptions of the androids throughout
the novel. This void, expressly existing between ―inhabited‖ words, contrasts the discreet points
of order which living creatures and biomes inherently produce according to Wiener‘s writings on
entropy. The elements of Burke‘s sublime – in particular obscurity, privation, and scale – are
decidedly at work in this description of cold and empty space. This impression extends quite
literally to the androids as well. Not only is the android an alienated subject, it is a subject that
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Deckard and Isidore, narrator and reader are all distinctly alienated from. Not only is the
narration never allowed to penetrate the psyches of the androids, the novel often holds their very
words suspect, circumlocution and subterfuge proving powerful tools in their attempts to evade
Deckard. Thus the androids become just as mysterious a force as the chaos they are associated
with.
Isidore instinctively denounces this lack of belonging or receptiveness to a living, natural
world as ―deplorable.‖ Despite the power of his ‗gut-reaction,‘ however, Isidore still feels he has
found a friend in Pris. Though other characters have similar reactions to the androids, this scene
is unique. Unlike both Deckard and Resch – the two other human figures who have direct contact
with the androids – Isidore is not a bounty hunter, and does not possess the same prejudice
toward the androids displayed by these characters. His reaction thus contradicts Barlow‘s
suggestion that this revulsion might have little to do with the androids but ―may be something
[socially wrong] in humans instead‖ (Barlow). If aversion to the androids were merely a
culturally conditioned prejudice, then Isidore should not have been affected, as he is unaware
that Pris is an android and ultimately rejects the aversion this revelation should bring. Indeed,
despite his ‗gut‘ reaction Isidore is able to look past his initial impression of Pris, seeking
companionship from her, and later from her compatriots Roy and Irmgrad. Isidore‘s
unconditioned response to meeting Pris, despite not having been influenced by these negative
preconceptions, reflects upon what makes her seem out of place as a living being.
As much as Isidore has in common with the androids (facing discrimination for his
radiation induced mental and physical degeneration) he also serves as a contrast to their cold,
analytical nature. Lacking what is considered standard human intelligence, Isidore possesses a
surplus of compassion, particularly for those who seem weaker than himself. He is eager to
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protect the androids from Deckard, who he envisions as ―a thing without emotions, or even a
face; a thing that got replaced immediately by another thing resembling it‖ (Dick 156). This
striking image underlines Deckard‘s own fear that he is becoming too much like the androids, a
characterless killer, replaced like a cog in a machine. It also displays a unique wisdom
contrasting both Deckard‘s zeal for his work and the androids‘ own troubling detachment: an
ethical appreciation for all beings. This is instanced by Isidore‘s horror at Pris and Imrgrad‘s
scientific dissection of the spider in order to find out whether or not it could ―get by on four‖ legs
(Dick 204).
It is fitting, then, that Isidore also seems the most in touch with Earth‘s ecological
devastation. What is most often described as a ―void‖ or uncanny ―silence‖ is a tangible and ever
present companion to the characters of Androids. This sensation seems immanent within the very
environment of the novel, waiting for any moment of quiet reflection to make it prescience
palpable; such as Isidore turning off his television set before going to work:
Silence. It flashed from the woodwork and the walls; it smote him with an awful
total power, as if generated by a vast mill. It rose from the floor, up out of the
tattered gray wall-to-wall carpeting. It unleashed itself from the broken and semibroken appliances in the kitchen, the dead machines that hadn‘t worked in all the
time Isidore had lived here. From the useless pole lamp in the living room it
oozed out, meshing with the empty and wordless descent of itself from the flyspecked ceiling. It managed in fact to emerge from every object within his range
of vision, as if it – the silence – meant to supplant all things tangible. Hence it
assailed not only his ears but his eyes; as he stood by the inert TV set he
experienced the silence as visible and, in its own way, alive. Alive! He had often

Schneeberger 67

felt its austere approach before; when it came, it burst in without subtlety,
evidently unable to wait. The silence of the world could not rein back its greed.
Not any longer. Not when it had virtually won. (Dick 18)
This spatially invasive silence, reflecting the larger issue of the growing inability of Earth to
support human life, is the same sublime elicited by contact with the androids, magnified to a
global scale. Isidore experiences this reified silence not only as alive, tangible to both the
auditory and visual faculties, but as pressing in from all directions, surrounding him with what
could almost be described as a paradoxical cacophony. An ―awful and total power,‖ the silence
of Androids is the ultimate articulation of Lyotard‘s privation: the possibility of nothing evoked
by the impression of the universe quite literally unmaking itself, until no ―things tangible‖ are
left, only entropic ―kipple‖ – refuse lacking any discernable organizing principle. Though wide
scale ecological devastation is a root cause of this sense of privation, the systemic institutions
Jameson attributes to the postmodern sublime also factor into this process. Lyotard helps
elucidate this connection in The Inhuman when he postulates the difference between what he
describes as a techno-scientific notion of time, contrasting his more humanistic prospective. The
former are positivist models, he claims, which flatten out linguistic modes and actors, creating a
homogenized set of exchange values that allow systems to optimize themselves against the
possibility of unwanted or unforeseen events; the ability of the system to maintain its own
existence against the specter of catastrophe. To this end, techno-scientific thought treats time in a
highly teleological fashion, cataloging and storing as much information as possible so as to
control the flow of time. According to Lyotard, this positivist mode closes out the possibility of
other ways of knowing in modernity – and postmodernity – which embrace the uncertainty of the
event as an important part of living:
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What counts in their manner of questioning is not at all to determine the reply as
soon as possible, to seize and exhibit some object which will count as the cause of
the phenomenon in question. But to be and remain questioned by it, to stay
through meditation responsive to it, without neutralizing by explanation its power
of disquiet. (Lyotard 74)
In essence Lyotard is writing of the human capacity to be moved, of the affective and ethical
processes that seem to be lost when positivist rationalism becomes the absolute arbitrator of
truth, and the concept of time is organized around the principle of forestalling events through the
ever accruing complexity of the monad. Capitalism, according to Lyotard, is the ultimate vehicle
of this process in the modern era, an organizational principle that so defines the course of human
history it becomes nearly impossible for the individual to conceive of something outside its
totality20. Privation in this context takes on two aspects, first capitalism tends to homogenize
experience to the extent that any possibility of an unforeseen event occurring is so forestalled it
seems to the subject as if nothing occurs at all, and secondly, the possibility of the unscripted
event actually coming to fruition becomes an abject, threatening subjects ill equipped to deal
with such an eventuality.
Returning to Isidore‘s experience of silence, one notes, again, that it is the shutting off of
his television that sets forth the terror of privation. Though the system (capitalism) is itself tied to
human materiality, and thus threatened by the same entropic forces destroying Earth‘s ecological
systems, it nonetheless maintains an almost hegemonic hold over human conception, as it is only
in the absence of television – one of the most vivid manifestations of consumerism at the time of
Dick‘s writing – that a sense of privation is allow to accost the ill-prepared subject, Isidore.
Despite this recourse to television, both Isidore and Irene‘s experience of this medium is tinged
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with a sense of ennui; a quiet distrust of the propaganda narratives put forth by the powers that
control their entertainment. Lacking a robust alternative to this system – Mercerism representing
an imperfect one – they return, however, again and again to these mechanical mediums.
Pervasive in these scenes, most importantly is a lack of meaning: the ‗natural‘ order of
Bookchin‘s social ecology, the organistic holism that allowed humans to perceive the Earth as a
living, breathing ―mother‖ described by Merchant, and finally the seemingly boundless fecundity
– terrifying yet inspiring – in the descriptions of Frankenstein’s landscapes, are faced with what
seems an inevitable ruin.
The loss of the unforeseen event is one reason for this lack of meaning; an inability of
Androids’ characters to contextualize themselves through the ambiguities of unmediated lived
experiences. If it were not for the postmodern ―programming‖ of modern society, living in these
types of extreme environments would most likely foreclose the possibility of a sublime moment,
for as Nye observes, those forced by circumstances to live in a marginal environment, rarely
experience this environment as sublime, for they are too busy striving to survive it. It is only
through the safe distance described by Burke and Kant, allowing for a space of intellectual and
affective reflection, that sublime experiences are allowed to manifest themselves. The world of
Androids – and perhaps modernity – is therefore unique, as it draws out a space for this type of
reflection even while environmental and systemic forces immediately threaten the existence of
the subject. Iran and Isidore are in essence caught in a sort of limbo, perversely kept alive and
passively attentive to decay as their world collapses around them. Ultimately what is being
articulated by Isidore‘s experience of silence, the apartment appliances described as ―dead,‖ the
―greed‖ of the final silence threatening to spread across the entirety of the planet, is the
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breakdown of what Lyotard – among others – would describe as the human spirit: an inability to
perceive meaning outside of positivist rationalism.
This inability to detect ―meaning‖ in the environment, and more broadly to find an
ecological niche, is endemic in the novel. Androids elevates this breakdown to an almost
ontological level; the moment a character‘s focus glides off an immediate object of interest –
Isidore shutting off the television – the experience of the void does not simply seep into a space
of intellectual reflection, but permeates the character‘s very consciousness. Androids’ characters
are thus incapable of psychologically distancing themselves from the silence of a ruined earth –
despite attempts to do so through artificial means. This entropic privation is the realization at
both an intellectual and sensational level of the inevitability of material decay, an experience of
the sublime forced upon the subject by the environmental damage visited upon the Earth, and the
inability to foresee truth outside of techno-scientific thought. Man-made nuclear disaster has
destroyed the biological systems which Wiener argues temporarily kept this natural dissipation
of energy in check. The result is existential crisis as humanity is faced with its mortality as a
species, turning away from this devastation in a perversely therapeutic fashion to the
consumerism proscribed by the very culture that brought about the nuclear holocaust.
Though Pris describes a similar experience on Mars – ―you feel it in the stones, the
terrible old age‖ – the androids seem as much a product of the forces that brought about these
lifeless environments as they are victims (Dick 148). Subject to the technical practices and
selfish drives that created them, the androids reflect these systemic processes. The same military
industrial complex that led to nuclear conflagration between The United States and Soviet Union
also created the first euphemistically named ―Synthetic Freedom Fighter‖ – the precursor to the
android (Dick 14). These massive corporations were slaves to the notion of positivist efficacy
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reflected in what Merchant calls a mechanistic view of nature, and Bookchin the ―technice‖ of
modern society. What is lost in this pure instrumentalism, despite its vast and proven capacity to
manipulate the natural world, is the possibility for the object to have meaning in and of itself:
Merchant‘s Earth as mother, Bookchin‘s animism, Adorno‘s mimesis. In turn this leads to the oft
theorized problem of reification; these institutions, unhindered by ethical concerns for the natural
world – or ostensibly even those of human communities – and capable of drawing a picture of
mass prosperity, take on a life of their own. A process that is perhaps best symbolized by the
silent infiltration of the androids – representative of an instrumentally rational humanity – into
the media, and the extent their interests are tied to those of the Rosen Association. The social
effect of this reification is Jameson‘s postmodern sublime; unease generated by a market driven
artificiality and a pervasive, often miss-directed sense of paranoia. Even more terrifying,
however, is what these systems presuppose: a universe that is truly meaningless and, as instanced
by earth‘s decay, rapidly spiraling into chaos.
Helping to stand against this chaos are the potential redemptive qualities of technology –
the communalism fostered by fusion with Mercer, implying that technology can soothe suffering
as well as create it. Interestingly, the development of the android in the novel contradicts
Lyotard‘s theories about the logical conclusion of techno-scientific thought. If, according to
Lyotard, humanity is to escape the confines of its terrestrial home, it will do so – according to the
techno-scientific mode – only through the complexification of a monad that has lost any
semblance of what we would recognize as humanity. The android, however, though serving as a
definition of what is decidedly anti-human, also, and through economic forces, appears to be
approaching a conceptual singularity with its creators. Humans like Deckard become more
androids-like, and the androids themselves, in order to better blend in with humans, slowly
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become – one imagines – more communal and ethical beings. Mercerism as a faith seems to
typify this ostensibly contradictory development. The religion‘s decidedly ironic character, its
conflation of the biological with the mechanical, its parody of Christian mysticism, and its
absurd spiritualization of ostensibly even the smallest microbe, all speak of a religious movement
that could exist only in a postmodern age. A combination of what one might describe as a
―rational‖ and an ―irrational‖ ethos; the dialectical conflation of enlightenment thought with
spiritualist extrapolations, seemingly contrary, but the only way in which this world can rectify
the cruel reality which it has been given.
Mercerism, and the technologically-mediated community it fosters, notably represents
many of the same values espoused by social ecologists. A care for all living beings, and an
understanding of human immanence within its environment – a ―return to nature‖ that may very
well have only been possible after wide scale ecological disaster. The story of Mercer,
experienced through the empathy boxes, begins with his ability as a youth to resurrect the
animals driven to extinction by nuclear war. This ability is taken from him by the ―killers,‖ who
then throw him into the ―tomb world,‖ a wasteland that seems to mirror Earth‘s dilapidation. He
is only allowed to emerge from this world when, ―the bones strewn around him grew back into
living creatures; he had become joined to the metabolism of other lives, and until they rose he
could not either‖ (Dick 22). This linking of human destiny to other biological creatures is an
important tenant of Mercerism and, as much as their scarcity, seems to inspire the hollowed
importance animal husbandry takes within the novel – manifesting itself as more of an attempt to
recapture the past, rather than allowing these animals to take their place within a complex
ecosystem. Mercer is then tormented by the ―killers‖ through a sort of purgatory until he reaches
the apex of a mountain, where he is presumably martyred and the process starts over again.
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Though Mercerism mirrors a number of Christian tropes – a suffering messiah, a
purgatory like climb towards redemption and a similar symbolic use of animals – it differs from
the religion it supposedly replaces in two important ways. The first is its lack of a transcendent
realm where salvation is to be achieved. There is no Heaven for the Mercerite. Learning to live
as a moral subject in this world has its own rewards: the sense of purpose humans derive from
their duty as stewards of Earth‘s last reaming life forms, and the distant hope for the rebirth of a
material Eden as represented by Mercer‘s ability to resurrect dead animals. The second is the
novel‘s parodic treatment of the religion from the prospective of readers – a form of Christianlike faith mediated through television screens, and whose savior is a doddering old man – and the
ease with which it is discredited by the androids. Despite the impression of parody surrounding
the religion, and its inability to remove its practitioners from their ruined world, Mercerism is not
discarded as a source of inspiration and solace for the novel‘s human characters. In the world of
Androids it seems the force of scientific rationalism has becomes so dominant that spiritual
alternatives can only exist in ironic form. The story Mercerism tells, however, that of death and
hope for redemption, of ―empathy‖ and ―killers,‖ never loses its significance.
The identity of the killers, symbolic of the forces that brought about Earth‘s destruction,
is left vague, a Mercerite being ―free to locate the nebulous presence of the Killers wherever he
saw fit‖ (Dick 30). Interestingly Buster Friendly fits this categorization rather well, his attempt to
scientifically discredit the religion missing entirely its greater social significance: the truth it
espouses about the importance of community. Similarly, Deckard identifies the androids as the
Killers, as Isidore does with Deckard, both of whom – Deckard and the androids – have their
capacity for empathy (and hence community) called into question. Deckard and the androids are
creatures of abstract necessity, killing not out of instinct, but as a calculation to achieve ends;
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money for Deckard, and scientific understanding with the dissection of the spider. Though
publically discredited, the significance of Mercerism – to the confusion of the androids – if
anything paradoxically grows in textual importance after the revelation of its leader as a fraud.
After his exposure, Mercer appears and speaks directly to Deckard, urging him to complete his
assignment to ―retire‖ the rogue androids:
You will be required to do wrong no matter where you go. It is the basic condition
of life, to be required to violate your own identity. At some time, every creature
which lives must do so. It is the ultimate shadow, the defeat of creation; this is the
curse at work, the curse that feeds on all life. Everywhere in the universe. (Dick
177)
This message given Deckard at the hands of a prophet – even if a discredited prophet – is the
secret of existence: the ultimate negation of self is the process of living. The entropy gripping
Earth in the form of Dick‘s kipple is ―the defeat of creation,‖ made absolute by a positivist vision
of reality that cannot see meaning beyond human interests. This is the same vision that drove the
bureaucracies leading to nuclear holocaust, and the economic institutions that produced the
androids. Without some sort of grounding principle, the ideal of life generating meaning cannot
resist the impinging necessity to close out such meaning: the realization that life thrives on and
can only exist in the context of death. This paradox is immanent within ecological systems:
biological beings are always in competition with one another to survive, a process that must at
once be accepted from a practical prospective and rejected from a moral one in order for ethical
communities to exist. Life‘s paradox is brought to the forefront of humanity‘s collective
consciousness by the seemingly imminent end of this process. The androids reflect this truism by
not only embodying an analytically driven tendency to kill, but by virtue of this tendency,
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seemingly necessitating their own extermination. They thus symbolize humanity‘s own selfdestructive potential. It is only through a return to what has been lost in the hegemony of
positivist epistemologies, an impression of ‗spirit‘ adhering to the process of living itself, that
some form of solace can be found in Dick‘s novel. This can be seen in the text‘s recourse to the
communal potential of Mercerism. It is only through the religion‘s cyclical yet ironic narrative of
life and death, and its dimly perceived potential to inject its own ethical imperatives into the
techno-scientific process – the bridging of man and machine making Mercerism possible – that a
future can be conceived in the world Dick has created. Though tentative, the faith ultimately
provides the ethical ground ecological critics like Merchant and Bookchin call for, even if this
ground was achievable in the novel only at the end of time itself.
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Conclusions
Though sharing many of the same concerns and themes, Frankenstein and Do Androids
Dream of Electric Sheep? are markedly different literary projects, expressing vastly diverse
reactions to the existential problems inherent to the processes of Western rationalism and
secularization. The resolutions of these two works are, as much as anything else, emblematic of
this difference. Frankenstein, the novel, the creature and the man, all find conclusion with
somber finality. With Victor gone and his creation soon to follow – if not in the end of his
material being, than at least in his movement beyond the bounds of human society – all which is
left is for Walton to carry the legend of Frankenstein back to civilization. This legend, however,
leaves a space to be filled, new content to be generated, new lives and stories to be told. Though
a man/humanity may die, there never seems to be a question as to the presence of some
purposive element beyond their continued or truncated existences. The Alps and the Arctic
symbolize other worlds, inhospitable for sure, but alive in their own right. Though the presence
of God is suspect in the novel, the energies Percy Shelley reveres in ―Mont Blanc,‖ and after
which he would model a foundation for human society remain. Despite the tragedy visited upon
his alter-ego, Victor, this natural world itself remains pristine, is never suspect, only the human
aspirations abstracted from it.
Contrasting this muted, but potentially fecund ending, is Deckard and Iran‘s resolution to
continue living. Rather than being a tightly woven plot, Androids embraces the ambiguities of its
postmodern age. The narrative‘s rough telos, vaguely maintained through the haze of its
paranoia and conspiracies unravels in the novel‘s final act. Given the immutable nature of
certain scientific truths – such as that surrounding entropy‘s inevitable decay – sensing meaning
in the material world is no longer a given, and thus something to be striven for. Mercerism, as
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much as anything else, seems to embrace what Lyotard would describe as the event: the momentto-moment living of the subject, concerned with unraveling the mysteries of existence immanent
within the process of being itself. Thus, there is no tight resolution to the novel, as such a
resolution would give in to Lyotard‘s notion of a positivist conception of tightly order time, and
by extension the abject threat to this system, entropy, which the novel can neither entirely
disavow nor accept.
The cyclical nature of the cultural trends contained within these novels should not be
overlooked. Bookended is the opening and closing of a gulf between humanity and the
environment. Though certainly not the beginning of the Enlightenment, Shelley‘s novel narrates
the process of its ideological tenants taking hold in the mind of her protagonist, as well as her
own unease about a reckless idealization of rationality. Androids represents the tail end of this
process, ebullience for intellectual advancement has burnt out in this futuristic society, if not for
its technocratic titans of industry. The result is a desperate return to nature, and the rebirth of the
spiritual institutions that seems commonplace to humanity in crisis. This return, however, comes
about only on the brink of destruction, and even then the systemic forces humanity has set in
motion – the market and its continued refinement of products like the androids – continue
unabated. The tensions contained in these novels, between ambition and duty, progress and
sustainability, played out in the interactions between sublime and beautiful spaces – physical and
intellectual – seem commonplace to human civilizations. In an age, however, of mass industry
and nuclear weapons, when devastation can be wrought upon a global scale, this interplay, and
the frictions it can create appear particularly dangerous.
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Notes

1

For both stylistic reasons, and the sake of brevity, I will often abbreviate Do Androids

Dream of Electric Sheep? as Androids.
2

This should not be confused with the recuperative moment Kant describes in both the

mathematical and dynamic sublime wherein recovery from a threat imposed upon the subject is
reconciled through an appeal to either the concepts or categorical imperatives respectively.
3

See ―Shelley‘s Green Dessert‖

4

My use of Habermas‘ ideas are somewhat liberal, as the systemic values he refers to are

what he terms the ―steering media‖ of money and power, which replace language as the primary
driving forces of everyday human interaction. Scientific inquiry, however, carries with it a
similar capacity – in my mind – to become a norm free form of rationality, especially when
entangled with economic concerns. It should also be noted that, though the reification of systems
into the life world is considered a problem by Habermas, he finds the existence of these
institutions in and of themselves unproblematic as long as they are properly moored to the
liveworld through a legal infrastructure.
5
6

See ―Frankenstein and the Sublime”
It should be remembered that the pastoralism represented by the DeLacey‘s is a

decidedly aristocrat ideal.
7

The marginality of Elizabeth in some ways seems similar to that of the DeLacey

Family, who we are introduced to through the lens of the Creatures narration. In both cases an
ideal counterpart/point is viewed from the prospective of a compromised other, whose disunion
with the object(s) of their affection proves disastrous.
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8

Mellor it should be noted associates Clerval with what Mary Shelley saw as her

husband‘s positive characteristics – the inspired poet and passionate lover – where as Victor, she
argues, personifies many of Percy‘s less attractive qualities – his radical ambitions and tendency
for spousal neglect.
9

For Kant the beautiful, though capable of being associated with affective responses, is

ultimately in its purest form unbound from emotionality, thus distinguishing his aesthetics from
the theories put forth by Mellor – and Burke – in her reading of Frankenstein.

11

See David Nye and Rob Wilson‘s work on the American Technological sublime (bib.),

as well as the ways in which it contrasts common European modes – also addressed in my
second chapter.
12

See ―Irrational Expectations; or, How Economics and the Post-Industrial World Failed

Philip K. Dick,‖ and ―Towards a Theory of Paranoia: The Science Fiction of Philip K. Dick.‖
13

In this chapter a fine distinction must be made between ―scientific‖ entropy (the

dissipation of energy within a closed system) which is both ultimately unavoidable and functions
in the novel as signifier inviting a sublime experience of privation, and the social disintegration
that is the result of this experience of privation.
14

See Exhilaration of terror and the Postmodern, ―Towards a Theory of Paranoia,‖ and

the Introduction to Philip K. Dick: Canonical Writer of the Digital Age.
15

That Iran notes her reaction to privation and entropy to be ―wrong‖ implies some higher

function ethical imperative is indeed in effect…
16

Though Bookchin has ardently attacked deep ecology and its attempts ―spiritualize‖ the

theories outlined in his social ecology, I believe the hard and fast distinctions he draws to be

Schneeberger 80

problematic. In particular his theorization of a rational – rather than rationally understandable
universe – poses an ontological foundation for reality which seems to be predicated upon an
―animate‖ universe that belies the type of ―hard rationality‖ Bookchin would like to attribute to
his social theories.
17

I am indirectly deploying Jurgen Habermas‘ idea of the differentiation of rationality –

as well as his focus on communicative rationality – which he utilizes to clarify what he feels is
Adorno‘s somewhat miss-directed attack upon rationalism. Though I agree with Habermas‘
move to differentiate types of truth, I tend to agree with the latter‘s more problematic
interpretation of the ill-effects of a hegemonic instrumentalist thought. See Habermas‘ first
volume of The Theory of Communicative Action for these critiques.
18

Nye notes governmental attempts to foster a more congenial relationship between

nuclear weapons and the public imagination – even the notion that atomic bombs could be put to
civil engineering purposes. These efforts, however, seemed to fail as the public became
increasingly acquainted with the destructive potential of the technology (See Chapter 9 of
American Technological Sublime).
19

Importantly, Habermas does not see the development of wide scale economic and

bureaucratic systems as a negative, as he believes these ―norm free blocks of sociality‖ are
necessary to rationally organize large ‗enlightened‘ societies. It is only when these systems take
a dominant role in society that he sees problems arising. Though I like the way in which
Habermas‘ theories – unlike many poststructuralist accounts – leave room for positivist accounts
―truth,‖ I disagree with how clean he makes these types of distinctions; both those between
system and lifeworld, and those between truth, rightness, and aesthetic considerations (adequacy)
the last of which he relegates to a significantly lesser status.
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20

Capitalist manufacturing, according to Lyotard, is what allows for the physical

manifestation of thought stored within the system, the development of new technology not
simple providing a new means to generate surplus value, but more importantly – in his mind –
allowing it to better catalog, homogenize and control information.
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